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I.

INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM.*

BY JOHN W. APPEL, ESQ., LANCASTER, PA.

"Our life is compassed round with necessity; yet is the meaning of life itself no other than freedom, than voluntary force."—GOETHE.

THE principle of individual freedom has been of slow growth in the history of mankind. It has taken centuries to teach man that he is formed to be free, and that all slavery is a sin. In all ages the individual, in one form or another, has been trodden in the dust; and all along the line of history are heard the wail of the slave and the cry of the down-trodden and oppressed. It was not until the opening of the modern era that the principle of individual freedom began to make itself felt in the lives and conduct of men. "A few centuries ago," says Prof. Hadley, "the principle of individual freedom was not recognized in law or in morals, any more than in trade."

The whole order of the ancient and middle-age civilization was antagonistic to the growth and development of individual

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freedom. In Sparta the state assumed control over the life of the individual from the earliest age of childhood; it prescribed his training and education, and, in many cases, his diet and mode of dress; the *patria potestas* was exercised in an unlimited degree; there was an equal division of land and a community of goods; all ate together at common and frugal tables; captives taken in war were enslaved; and slavery generally was recognized as a normal institution in society. Plato in his Republic found no room for individual freedom; he taught that the industrial and producing classes needed no education; and he made the most private personal relations of life subject to the supervision and control of the government. Aristotle taught that in the best regulated states no mechanic should be a citizen, and all tillers of the ground should be serfs; he believed that education should be taken out of the charge of parents, and that the state should regulate marriages and the begetting of children. In the ancient states generally, freedom, as the inalienable right of the individual, was not dreamed of either in law or ethics. "The religious and political sanction determined for every one his mode of life, his creed, his duties and his place in society, without leaving any scope for the will or reason of the individual himself."

The system was perhaps the wisest for the times. States were forming and society was evolving from chaos. The relation between different tribes and peoples was that of hostility. War was the chief occupation of man, and the struggle was not so much between individuals as between tribes, countries, tongues, civilizations. The first duty of the individual was to fight for the preservation of the state or political organization which he represented.

The system was productive of good in that it brought men into subjection to law and authority. In this sense it was disciplinary, and laid the foundation for the freedom of after ages; for the first step towards freedom lies in the direction of obedience.

But the system became tyrannical, and, after entailing long

years of suffering and sorrow upon humanity, it died of its own iniquities. Whilst it built up great states and empires, it degraded man to the condition of a slave. It robbed him of his individuality, and deprived him of his most sacred personal rights. It prescribed what he should eat and drink; how he should dress and wear his hair; what occupation he should engage in and whom he should marry; and it even undertook to control his speech and thought. Constantine, for example, under threat of death, commanded possessors of Arian writings to be surrendered for burning in public. In 536 Justinian prescribed amputation of the hand for all who copied Nestorian writings. In the time of King Edward III., of England, it was enacted by Parliament, on account of the excessive use of meats, that no man should be served at any time, at any meal with more than two courses. In the time of Edward IV. the fine gentlemen of the times were forbidden by statute to wear pikes upon their shoes and boots of more than two inches in length. At another time a law was passed forbidding the people to play cards—even in their own houses—on Sundays. In the same line were the acts of the Spanish Inquisition and Censorship, the narration of which would now seem to be little less than a libel upon the race,—not to make mention of the scenes of Tower Hill, Canterbury and Smithfield in England.

The system culminated politically in the divine right of kings. The will of the king became absolute. He imposed taxes and imprisoned subjects at will. Justice became a matter of caprice. Louis XIV. said, "I am the State," and James I., of England, maintained that hereditary monarchy had the especial sanction of the Almighty; that the rights and privileges of the people were merely concessions of the king, which might be revoked at pleasure; and he told his Parliament that they had no more business to inquire what he might lawfully do than what the Deity might lawfully do.

The modern movement has been in the opposite direction altogether. Instead of the divine right of kings, we have the divine right of the people. Instead of the state owning the

people, the people own the state. The individual has become his own master, and holds the reins of his life in his own hands. In other words, the movement has been in the direction of individual freedom—politically, socially, morally and religiously. As men emerged from the terrible darkness of the middle ages, they began to see their miserable condition and to long for freedom. The Renaissance inspired them with new ideas, new hopes, new aspirations. It enlarged their horizon, increased their store of knowledge, and revealed to them their true dignity. It ushered in a new era in history. "It seems as though men had suddenly opened their eyes and seen." It questioned the entire existing order of things, and, with a revolution in art and education and science, there came also a revolution of human rights; and man, patient man, after waiting through the long centuries, Prometheus-like, to be free, at last felt the chains of slavery relax. "What the Reformation exhibits in the sphere of religion and politics," says the late Prof. Nevin, in his new work on the "History of English Literature," published by the Alumni Association of this college, "the revival of letters displays in the sphere of culture, art and science—the recovered energy and freedom of humanity."

The secular and religious movement for liberty went hand-in-hand. The precious seed-thought sown in Galilee, that every human creature is a child of God, born for immortality, and an object of divine favor, began to bear fruit and to give a new dignity and meaning to individual life. But for the gospel of Christ the precious tree of liberty which is the boast and glory of our civilization to-day, had never taken root and flourished as it has. The movement for religious liberty culminated in the Protestant Reformation in Germany, and for civil and political liberty in the French Revolution. The Renaissance was a broader movement than either of these, and embraced them both. The impulse for freedom was especially awakened in France. Through her ran the central currents of the world's life in the direction of liberty. Voltaire questioned existing institutions, wrote on the "Customs and Genius of Nations,"

and advocated the doctrine of equality before the law. Diderot, D'Alembert, and the encyclopædists discussed theories of government and social questions; Abbe Morelly presented the claims of communism; Abbe Raynal combatted slavery; Montesquieu searched for the title-deeds of mankind, wrote on the "Spirit of Laws," and investigated the conditions of political freedom; and Rousseau, the apostle of liberty, lighted the torch of freedom when he made the startling statement to the world: "Man is born free and yet we see him everywhere in chains, and those who believe themselves the masters of others cease not to be even greater slaves than the people they govern." Underlying the French Revolution was the struggle for freedom, equality and fraternity. Back of the fair hand of Corday, of the emeute, of the bloody scenes of the Bastille and the guillotine were the cries of an oppressed people struggling for freedom. These cries found utterance in the famous declaration of the Rights of man, October 6, 1789, which declared the original equality of mankind; that the ends of social unity are liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression; that sovereignty resides in the nation, and every power emanates from them; that freedom consists in doing everything which does not injure another; that law is the expression of the general will; that public burdens should be borne by all the members of the state in proportion to their fortunes; that the elective franchise should be extended to all, and that the exercise of natural rights has no other limit but their interference with the rights of others. Similar movements for liberty took place in Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Austria and Russia. In England the great landmarks in the progress of liberty are found in the declarations of the great charter of liberty wrested from King John; in the *confirmatio cartarum* of Edward I.; in the Petition of Right; in the *habeas corpus* act under Charles II.; in the Bill of Rights in 1688; and in the Act of Settlement.

In our own country principles of individual freedom, which in times past and in other countries it required bloody revolu-

tion to settle, are accepted as maxims and are embodied in written constitutions. Thus it is declared that "All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation and of pursuing their own happiness." Orders of nobility and primogeniture (although at one time in Pennsylvania, the eldest son was entitled to a double share in the distribution of estates) have been abolished; unlimited freedom of conscience and religious worship is enjoyed; the free communication of thoughts and opinions is declared to be one of the invaluable rights of man; the people are made secure in their persons, houses, and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures; they are granted the privileges of *habeas corpus*; and they have a right in a peaceable manner to assemble together for their common good and to apply for redress of grievances. The absolute rights of the individual, the right of personal liberty, personal security, of private property, and of religion are universally respected; freedom of contract is unrestricted; and freedom of private conduct is almost unlimited. Men may love and hate, think and believe, rest and work, as they please; they are free to choose their vocations, their wives, and their homes; they may attend religious worship or not as they please; they may choose their own education; and, in general, do as they please so long as they do not interfere with the rights of others. As regards freedom of thought, John Beattie Crozier in "Civilization and Progress" says of us: "In America freedom of thought and sentiment is so complete, that you have the spectacle hitherto unknown of Catholics and Protestants, Atheists and Mormons, Free-lovers, Shakers and Quakers, all living quietly side by side in peaceable toleration."

The movement of history, through the centuries, towards individual freedom has been well characterized by the saying that in the East one was free, in Greece and Rome some were free, and in the modern state all are free.

On the broad and general lines thus briefly noticed, much has been accomplished, especially in modern times, for man's individual freedom. Nevertheless the great problem is still unsolved. It is to-day one of the most serious questions of the times, and, at this moment, is agitating the ablest economists on both sides of the Atlantic. It lies at the root of strikes and the great social agitations of the times; it is involved in the pretensions of socialism and anarchism; it underlies cases like the Debs case at Chicago, and the income-tax case lately before the Supreme Court of the United States; and in our legislatures and Congress it is a matter of almost daily discussion.

The writers on the subject are divided into two schools. The one school contends that the greatest good is achieved by the enjoyment of the greatest amount of individual freedom (unrestricted action on the part of the individual); the other school believes the dangers and evils with which such freedom is attended outweigh its advantages. The tendency of the one school is to run into the extreme of individualism, and of the other into the extreme of collectivism and socialism. The truth lies somewhere between these two constantly warring extremes. There are two forces or factors operative in human life, the one general and the other particular; and the difficulty lies in our inability to define the proper relation of the one to the other. The individualist ignores the general factor, and the socialist the particular factor. Both factors must be duly recognized, and the question is not so much which one must be subordinated to the other, but how are they to be adjusted and harmonized. Any theory that ignores either factor is false and untrue.

The true idea of individual freedom, therefore, is, or must be, based, first, upon the significance of the individual life in itself considered; second, upon the relation which it sustains to society and the general life of the race; and third, upon the relation which it sustains to God. Every life has an infinite significance of its own, and this it has only in its relation to society and the general life of humanity, and to God. These three factors—the individual, society and God—are the essential

and determining factors in the solution of the problem of individual freedom.

In every individual there is a God-given personality. It is the *ego* in man, the reflection of the "I am" of the great Jehovah himself. It links us with the Divine Mind itself, and is therefore something sacred. In the language of Mulford:—"Since personality has its origin in God its spiritual and inner life is immediately with God. Its course is in the light in which no shadow falls, as it is unmeasured by time; it is the path which the vulture eye has not traced, and it is as 'the flight of one alone to the Only One.'" In this view the individual life is of far more account than all the innumerable worlds that fill illimitable space. The individual man is made in the image of God. He is created first and foremost in order that he may attain his own perfection. He is in this sense an end in himself. He is endowed with powers and faculties that must be developed and perfected primarily for their own sake. It is a mistake to regard the individual life as a means to an end, or to subordinate it to some other end in life. Every individual is a world in himself. He is a special creation and stands out as distinct as a star in the firmament. It is the individual soul that is created for immortality, and it is the individual soul that may be lost. Where the individual life is obliterated or absorbed in some other life it becomes a failure, and civilization is in a greater or less degree retarded. This is true because every human individual is created to be a vehicle for the revelation of some particular phase of the absolute truth. The absolute truth we can never fully comprehend, nor can it be revealed in its fulness in the life of any single man or aggregation of men; but every individuality or personality is a partial revelation of that truth and fulfills its true mission only as it is permitted to expand and grow to perfection.

In this view it is the duty of every man to cling to and work out the type of his own individuality. This implies, it is true, that man must first and foremost live for himself. It means self-preservation, self-culture, self-aggrandizement. It means the

adoption to a certain extent of the principles of egoism and selfishness. But these selfish principles are not wrong when operative within certain limits and in the view now under consideration. A certain amount of selfishness is necessary to the proper development of every man's life, and it only becomes an evil when it is made the dominating centre of his life.

Any system of laws, or government or organized society, therefore, that attempts to crush out the individual life, is wrong in principle and should be subverted. No form of society is true that does not respect all the rights of the individual. The rights of personality must be duly recognized and strenuously maintained. The great crime of absolutism is that it overrides the individual will. It arbitrarily dictates the conduct of men in the most private concerns of life. It restricts thought, private judgment and conscience. Instead of making men free citizens it reduces them to the condition of soldiers in an army whose only duty is to render blind obedience to those in command :

"Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die."

Under such a regime all trace of the individual is lost—he becomes a mere machine, "a mechanized automaton." The same crime exists in all systems of rank collectivism, communism and socialism. All incentive to individual exertion is taken away. The hope of reward for labor and heroic action is gone. No room is made for the free play of the different faculties of men ; no regard is had for the differences in men's physical, intellectual and moral qualities ; and all are reduced to the same level and treated alike, the weak and the strong, the wise and the ignorant, the deserving and the undeserving. Herein lies the fallacy of Mr. Bentham's formula : "Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one ;" of Mr. Mill's utilitarian principle : "One person's happiness is counted for exactly as much as another's ;" of Mr. Bellamy's theory : "The world and everything that is in it will ere long be recognized as the common property of all, and undertaken and administered for the equal

benefit of all;" and of the communistic principle, as stated by M. de Laveleye: "That the individual works for the profit of the state, to which he hands over the product of his labor for equal division among all."

The proper conception of the significance of the life of the individual implies that each man shall be free to develop his own type of being, and that he shall reap the rewards of his labor and suffer the consequences of his ill-doing. As Mr. Herbert Spencer expresses it: "The production and maintenance of the best individuals are achieved by conformity to the law that each shall receive the good and evil results of his own nature and consequent conduct. Hence, other things equal, the greatest prosperity and multiplication of efficient individuals will occur where each is so constituted that he can fulfill the requirements of his own nature without interfering with the fulfillment of such requirements by others."

In order that every individual may reach his proper development, he must be made secure in the enjoyment, amongst other things, of the rights of personality, of existence and subsistence, of freedom, honor, education, vocation, speech, thought, and voluntary association with his fellows. And the state must co-operate with the individual in fulfilling the duties which he owes to himself, and in the attainment of his rights. It must pay regard to his life, health, personal freedom and honor. It is not enough that the state enacts laws by which the individual shall be protected simply against plunder, loss of character, freedom, etc., under a merely negative view. The true function of the state is to make the most of the citizen, and this implies that it must afford him positive help in the development of his own genius. This is coming to be better understood than formerly, and lies at the foundation of all the social movements of modern times.

But individual freedom does not consist in each man being free to regulate his life according to his own will without limitation or restraint, although that seems to be the popular conception of freedom. Many societies are formed in these days for

the promotion of personal liberty, by which is meant the right to act without restriction of any kind, each man being a law unto himself. This conception of freedom is especially prevalent among the foreign-born element in our country. Freed from the restraints of the old-world civilizations, they imagine that here in this land of the free there is no law or authority that they are bound to respect, and they flaunt the red flag of anarchy and lawlessness, and become the avowed enemies of all government and law. They attempt to dictate terms of labor, and when they meet with resistance they resort to fire and sword, strikes and riots. This is not freedom, but its very opposite. Freedom involves limitation and restraint, and in order to be free man must regulate his conduct, not according to his own will, but according to the law of his being, with a view to its perfection. This is true even of our bodily nature. If we do not curb the physical impulses and desires, the body becomes a wreck; but if we train and develop the body according to the law of its being, it becomes a thing of beauty, fit temple for the habitation of the soul.

It is a mistake, therefore, to suppose that when men are made subject to limitation and restraint they are deprived of their freedom. Law and authority are not inconsistent with the idea of freedom.

"Orders and degrees

Jar not with liberty, but well consist."

Montague says: "The sphere of law and the sphere of liberty are really one," and Locke says: "Where there is no law, there is no freedom."

There are those who look upon law and government as encroachments upon the liberty of the individual. Mr. Spencer says: "All-embracing state-functions characterize a low social type; and progress to a higher social type is marked by relinquishment of functions." "State functions should be restricted rather than extended."

According to this theory the state is looked upon as something hostile to the interests of the individual, and we are told the less

law and government we have, the better for the individual. The fallacy here consists in making the state merely something empirical, a mere contractual relation, something that may, or may not exist, or that may be laid aside; and in assuming that there can be any true freedom apart from the state and society, as, for instance, in a so-called state of nature. The state and organized society are more than that. There are no individuals before society. There are no so-called natural human rights outside of society. Alexander Selkirk possessed neither rights nor freedom. Men only acquire rights and freedom as they become members of organized society. The idea of the state is just as fundamental as the idea of the single man. Man's nature presupposes the state. The social instinct, the moral obligation, the sense of justice and law, are not acquired, they are inherent in man's nature. The state is not a necessary evil tolerated only on account of the existence of vice and crime. If there were no crime the state would still be a necessity. It is the order for the unfolding and development of man's moral nature and the actualization of the will of God in its relation to man in human history. Personal or individual freedom can be attained only in and through this order. The individual can be free only as he yields obedience to law and authority. The true conception of freedom implies, we grant, that this obedience must be free, the result of choice or consent; it must be intelligent and spontaneous or autonomic. But how can this stage of freedom be reached except through the discipline of the lower stage where obedience is enforced? I know there is a tendency in some quarters to hold law in disrepute because, as it is said, it stands for force and coercion. But governments and administrative law are teachers. They teach us what the law is; they are the organs of the revelation of law. The law, as Hooker expresses it, has its seat in the bosom of God; it is in its ultimate sense the will of God. But it must be discovered by the light of reason, it must be revealed to us in some form; and this is accomplished through the lawgiver, the statesman, the judge. The true legislature will always be in advance of the common con-

sciousness or will. Man does not make the law, it is true; but he discovers it, he interprets it, he declares what it is. And this is the mission of states and governments, as well as the enforcement of the law. We may yield the point that administrative law is, to a certain extent, a schoolmaster, and there is little virtue in enforced obedience to its behests; but our contention is that through its enforcement the law becomes revealed to us in its might, majesty, and power, and becomes the handmaid of religion in lifting us up from the plane of legalism into the empyrean sphere of love where obedience becomes a matter of free choice, just as the government in the family aids in leading the child finally to a loving obedience to the will of the parent. In this sense we regard government as a boon, and not a burden which ought not to be borne. And in this sense we believe in strong government. And so long as government and law are true to their idea, we believe we cannot have too much of them for the elevation of man and the civilization of the world. Regarded simply as a police system we have great faith in the state as a power in civilization. We need the strong arm of the state to prevent wrong-doing and to secure men in the enjoyment of their rights. If this safeguard were removed, society would soon lapse into barbarism. And there never was a time when government and law were so much needed as at present; and we believe as society becomes more and more complex the functions of government will be increased instead of diminished. "In the era upon which we are entering," says Mr. Kidd, in his *Social Evolution*, "the long up-hill effort to secure equality of opportunity, as well as equality of political rights, will, of necessity, involve not the restriction of the interference of the state, but the progressive extension of its sphere of action to almost every department of our social life. The movement in the direction of the regulation, control, and restriction of the right of wealth and capital must be expected to continue even to the extent of the state assuming these rights in cases where it is clearly proved that their retention in private hands must unduly

interfere with the rights and opportunities of the body of the people." *

The proper exercise of the functions of the state is not hostile, but conducive to the freedom of the individual. The restrictions and limitations of law and authority are not in reality restrictions and limitations upon individual freedom in any true sense, but rather conditions for the development and growth of freedom. This is true with reference to the limitations society places upon us so far as our moral freedom is concerned. No one can deny that self-denial, restraint, disappointment, defeat, pain, sorrow, long-suffering, temperance, the bearing of each other's burdens, the sacrifices of an altruistic life, all are necessary conditions for the perfection of our moral well-being.† Thus society acts, as Montague says, not so much to restrain as to emancipate.

The tendency of the age, especially in our country, is towards the extreme of individualism. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that while we guard jealously our freedom as individuals, we do not lose sight of the fact that true freedom is only found in the bosom of society and under the fostering care of the state; and, while we plead for individual freedom as something sacred, we also plead for a proper reverence and respect for law and government as affording necessary and proper conditions for the realization of that freedom. Instead of arraying ourselves against the state as a necessary evil, it is our

* Justice Brown, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in an address to the graduates of Yale Law School, delivered June 25, 1895, intimates that the functions of the government may be very greatly enlarged, so that it may become the owner of all national monopolies, the controller of all traffic, passenger, freight, and intelligence, while at the same time this may be done without any danger of interfering with the right of the individual to acquire and hold property, provided such acquirement is characterized by justness of the relation of the individual to his fellow-man. He deprecates the uses corporations have made of their wealth, and declares that the press and the bar are the great safeguards of liberty.

† "Be thankful, even when tired and faint,
For the rich bounties of restraint."

— Wordsworth.

sacred duty to uphold it and cherish it as our greatest benefactor next to religion. The state will thus become our pride and our glory. As Mulford beautifully expresses it: "The state thus becomes for the individual an heritage; and not his alone, but to be held for those who shall follow him. The wealth of its historic associations and the grandeur of its historical epochs are its gifts. The majesty of its law and the authority of its government, and its conquering power are around him; its acquisition is his vantage ground; its domain is his home; its order is his working field; its rights are the armor it has forged for him; its achievements are the nobler heights he treads; its freedom is the ampler air he breathes."

But the general life of the race is more than merely the condition for the development of individual freedom. It is something broader and deeper, and in some respects grander than the individual life. The individual life is but a span, a breath. It comes forth like a flower and flees like a shadow. A few years of enthusiasm, hope, work, joy, sorrow, and it is all over. It is hardly rightly commenced before the end is visible on the horizon. At best it is most unsatisfying and unsatisfactory. As the seconds are ticked off on the dial of time, so man's life is taken from him.

"Like a swift-fleeting meteor, a fast-flying cloud,
A flash of the lightning, a break of the wave,
Man passeth from life to his rest in the grave.

"The hand of the king that the sceptre hath borne;
The brow of the priest that the mitre hath worn;
The eye of the sage and the heart of the brave
Are hidden and lost in the depths of the grave."

But the great stream of history ever moves on, growing wider and deeper.

"For men may come and men may go;
But I go on forever."

The race-life is something more than the mere aggregation of individual lives. As Dr. Gerhart in his "Institutes" expresses it: "Mankind is an organism. Individuals are not independ-

ent units, accidentally associated; all are members of one vital constitution, developed from the same stock, realizing the same physical and ethical type and informed by the same law of life." If this be true, then the life of humanity is something more than merely the sum total of individual lives, just as the organism of the tree is something more than the sum of its parts.* The idea of humanity is not an abstraction, but a concrete, living entity, unfolding itself in the process of history. It grows and develops according to certain laws. It has a genius, a character, a mission of its own. There is a goal of history which is not merely the perfection of the individual, as John Beattie Crozier contends in "Civilization and Progress," but also the perfection of the race-life. The individual must be perfected and saved, it is true; but so must humanity and civilization. According to Dr. Nevin, "Man's completeness as an individual involves of itself his comprehension in a life more general than his own, and the end of morality lies not only in the perfection of the individual, but in the perfection of society as well." No one can read history aright without being profoundly impressed with this truth. It is seen in the development of nations and in the evolution of the race as it moves on according to method, order and law, not in a circle, but to its destiny, however remote. When we speak of the spirit or tendency of an age, the genius or character of a people, the glory and honor of a nation, of public virtue, public conscience and public consciousness, we do not speak of abstractions, we are not indulging in mere figures of speech; but we refer to living and substantial realities. The life, spirit and genius of America are more real and substantial than her mountains, her lakes, her rivers and her forests. Men are everywhere sensible of this general life of the state or nation. They are caught up by it and yield to its power and influence. When we see our country's flag unfurled to the

* "As leaves are to the tree whereon they grow
And wither, every human generation
Is to the Being of a mighty Nation."

—Wordsworth.

breeze, what is it that thrills us with joy but the fact that we see in it the symbol of a life that we have learned to love? What is the meaning of all patriotism but love, not simply for native land, but for our country's life, its genius and its spirit, including its institutions, its laws and its government? In the same way there is a love that goes out for humanity at large. There is such a thing as enthusiasm for humanity. The great benefactors of mankind have all been inspired with this idea; and their memory is ever blessed because they lived for the elevation of the race, the welfare of humanity. Thus history attests it, the lives of all great men and heroes attest it: that there is a general life of the race, of humanity, which men must live for, and, if need be, die for. As our own poet, Lowell, says:

"He's true to God who's true to man. Wherever wrong is done
To the humblest and the weakest, 'neath the all-beholding sun,
That wrong is also done to us; and they are slaves most base
Whose love of right is for themselves, and not for all their race."

Herein then comes a broader challenge to the individual than that which meets him in the exactions of state duties and obedience to authority. Above and beyond the plane of the law, the individual must bow in submission to the claims of humanity; the particular will must submit to the general will; the private judgment must harmonize with the general judgment; the individual life must conform to the general race life. This again involves sacrifice, restriction and limitation; but, nevertheless, instead of depriving man of his freedom, it only serves to promote it. To quote Dr. Nevin again:—"Liberty is an ethical fact, which stands just in this that the single will, in virtue of that divine autonomy of self-motion which belongs to it by its creation, flows over the boundaries of the individual life in which it has its rise, and make-itself one with the pure ether of truth that surrounds it, the glorious sea of light in which it is carried and borne."

Man's true freedom as an individual, however, is found in his free and voluntary submission and obedience to the will of

God. The great Commentator Blackstone says:—"Man considered as a creature must necessarily be subject to the laws of the Creator, for he is entirely a dependent being, and consequently, as man depends absolutely upon his Maker for everything, it is necessary that he should in all respects conform to his Maker's will." It is only as we live and move and have our being in God that we are free. Apart from Him we are like a vessel in mid-ocean without chart or compass drifting helplessly before wind and wave to certain shipwreck. In Him all our powers, bodily, mental, moral and spiritual, develop in their normal lines, and our lives become as the harmony of the spheres. "Our hearts are made for Thee, O God, and cannot rest until they rest in Thee." And just here is where the individual finds his true mission in life, which is to do the will of God. In this view it is possible for every life to be a success. Other standards of success in life may be and are set up by men, but they are false and inadequate. If we set up as the standard of success wealth, worldly honor and fame, intellectual achievement, military conquest and renown, we set up standards that in the very nature of the case, in the great majority of lives, can never be realized; and most men might as well give up the struggle at the very outset. But judged by this standard, it is possible for every human being, no matter how low or humble, rich or poor, favored or unfavored, to make a success of his life.

"Who does his best his circumstance allows,
Does well, acts nobly. Angels could no more."

The man who performs as best he can the duties which God lays upon him is the free man, he is the successful man. This may involve, it will involve, self-sacrifice, a giving up of selfish ends, for the benefit of others, for one's country or for the race; but it will be the fulfillment of the mission of life. Nay, more, it will be the realization of the highest and truest and best type of individual freedom. A life poised upon self is not free, but slavish. This is true even with reference to what are called self-regarding acts. "To be overruled by the pitiless forces of chance and passion, this is slavery, this is the extinction of in-

dividuality" The man whose soul is shriveled with greed or consumed with ambition, is not a free man, but a slave, a slave to passion. Neither can men whose lives are given over to "uncleanness, wrath, strifes, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revelings, and such like" be said to move in the sphere of freedom. This is the slavery we are exhorted to avoid in the injunction:—"Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage." The altruistic life is the free life, and we need not stop to inquire whether it has a rational or super-rational sanction. Whatever sanction it may have, it is coming to be recognized as the true rule of conduct. The serious thinkers of the age are fast drifting away from the egoistic principle. The principle of the survival of the fittest may answer for animal and vegetable life, but it cannot answer for the perfection of the ethical life of man. It is the principle of Cain in another form. It is godless and cruel when applied in the sphere of morals. It will not do to distort the theory as is sometimes done when it is said that where the Christian principle or the altruistic or any unselfish principle triumphs in the ethical sphere, there you have the principle of the survival of the fittest because these principles being the fittest have survived others that have been found wanting; for this is a perversion of the meaning of the principle as defined by its advocates. They do not apply the principle in that way. The principle of the survival of the fittest is based upon selfishness, that of love upon unselfishness; and the two can no more harmonize than can the good and the bad harmonize. The principle of the survival of the fittest leads to unlimited competition, which means that the strong shall be allowed to crush out the weak, "as the eagle pounces upon the lamb and the wolf preys upon the ewe." It is the principle of the struggle for existence as we have it in the animal world, but not the rule which guides us in the sphere of morals. Unlimited competition enables the strong to crush everything that stands in their way and with relentless fury to grind to death the poor and the weak. It lies at the root

of the industrial slavery of the day, and of the insatiate greed of great corporations which prey upon the vitals of society. Unlimited competition says to the man of great possessions: "Increase thy pile, gather to thyself all the wealth thou canst, outstrip thy rivals and make the multitude subservient to thy will." But Christ says: "Go thy way, sell whatsoever thou hast and give to the poor." The altruistic Christian principle repudiates the doctrine of unlimited competition altogether. It is based not upon the principle of selfishness, but upon the principle of love—love to God and man. It finds expression in acts of self-abnegation rather than in those of self-assertion; it teaches us to bear each other's burdens; it lays stress not so much upon our rights as our duties; it asks not so much what of thine shall be mine as what of mine shall be thine; it leads us to inquire not so much what we can accomplish for ourselves, as what we can do for others; "it gives rise, not to the impulse to crush those who stand in our way, clash with us in our pursuits and hinder us of our profit or pleasure, but to the longing to lift up those that are fallen, to soothe pain, to assuage grief, to heal remorse, to give light to the blind, health to the sick and consolation to those who are oppressed and have none to comfort them." It is true this brings us to a morality that is based upon the principles of religion; but that is where after all every true system of morality will find its ultimate sanction. The moral teachings of the great Master are neither unscientific, illogical, nor irrational; on the contrary, they will in the end be found to harmonize with the highest science, the truest logic, and the best reason. Man's religious nature is not something separate, distinct, and altogether different, from his intellectual and moral nature, but the two are organically related; and what is true for one will be found to be true for both, just as what is false for one will be found to be false for both. In other words, you cannot prescribe one system of morals for man based upon science, and another different system based upon religion. You do violence to man's nature whenever you divorce religion and morals in that way. The whole matter with reference to man's duty in fulfilling the will of God and

finding therein his true freedom is summed up in the injunction:—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets. This is the key to all right human conduct. Every life that is guided by this commandment, will be brought into harmony with the will of God and will fulfill its true mission. It will not only find its right relation to God, but also to man and society at large; and rooted and grounded in love, which is the fulfilling of the law, it will grow, and expand, and ripen, for the realization of that perfect freedom which we are told and have every reason to believe reigns in the kingdom for whose coming we pray daily.

It is on these lines, only too feebly indicated, that, we believe, the problems of individual freedom must be worked out in history. Due allowance, it is true, must be made for imperfect and corrupt human laws, government, and social organizations; but because they are imperfect and corrupt they are not to be subverted, but rather to be purified, elevated, and redeemed. And man's true freedom will be realized, not in the wild savage life of nature; not in a life poised upon self as a centre; not in the dreams of the socialist, collectivist, or anarchist; not in absolutism nor in the false individualism of the day; not in strikes nor wars; nor yet in the cruel synthetic philosophy of the survival of the fittest; but in the bosom of society and under the softening influences of civilized life; in a life of unselfishness; in a proper respect for, and obedience to, law and governmental authority; in love for, and devotion to, the cause of humanity; and, finally, in the free and voluntary submission of the individual will to the will of Him whose service is *Perfect Freedom*.

"To suffer woes which hope thinks infinite;
To forgive wrongs darker than death or night;
To defy Power which seems omnipotent;
To love and bear; to hope till hope creates
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates;
Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent;
This, like thy glory, Titan, is to be
Good, great, and joyous, beautiful and free;
This is alone Life, Joy, Empire, and Victory."

II.

ST. PAUL'S SEEMING ABOLITION OF THE LAW.

BY T. W. CHAMBERS, D.D.

THERE have been not a few in time past, as there are some now, who deny the continuing authority of the Ten Words, basing their opinion on the utterances of the great Apostle.

A tract of Augustin (*Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum*) indicates the appearance of such an opinion in the fourth century. But the first trace of the tendency is found in the Gnostic systems, which often drop the whole moral sphere of human life as something to which a truly spiritual man could and should be entirely indifferent. The full development of Antinomianism was made at the Reformation. Agricola (†1566), a disciple of Luther, carrying out some unguarded utterances of the great Reformer, maintained that evangelical repentance has no connection whatever with the law; that it is awakened simply by a view of the offence committed against God's grace and love in Christ; and that it is therefore of faith in the sense of not being produced by any representation of the divine justice and anger. This error was vigorously opposed by Luther and Calvin, and they introduced special statements into their writings to guard against any such violent misapplication of the evangelical doctrine. After the death of Agricola, Antinomian opinions were advocated in Germany by Amsdorf, even to the extent of maintaining that good works are an obstacle to salvation; but these heresies were condemned in the *Formula Concordiæ*. In the next century the error reappeared in England as a result of ultra-Calvinism. Dr. Tobias Crisp (†1642) repudiated the law "as cruel and tyrannical, requiring that

which is naturally impossible," etc. But he was met by a host of opponents, among whom were Williams and Baxter; and the Westminster Assembly proposed to have his sermons burnt.* Other opponents of the continued obligation of the decalogue appeared in the eighteenth century, but with a difference. Some magnified grace, to the overthrow of the law, in order to vindicate to themselves a liberty to sin; others simply made a distinction between the demands of Christ and those of the law, and maintained that the former were binding and the latter not, because their essential substance is given in the gospel. The first of these two classes seems to have died out, but the second has by no means disappeared.

Professor G. C. Knapp, in his "Christian Theology,"† following Zanchius, an eminent divine of the Reformation period, holds that the entire Mosaic law is abolished, and that certain parts of it, which are still binding, are so not because announced from Sinai, but because they are founded in the constitution of our nature and are re-imposed by Christ. Archbishop Whately, in his "Essay on the Abolition of the Law," says that it appears on the face of the Decalogue that its precepts, moral as well as ceremonial, were intended for the Israelites exclusively, and therefore cannot by their own authority be binding on Christians, and hence are to them abolished. In like manner Dr. Alfred Barry, in the article on the law of Moses, in Smith's Bible Dictionary, insists that "the formal coercive authority of the law as a whole ended with the close of the Jewish dispensation." He says that "it is impossible to make distinctions between the different parts of the law, or to avoid the conclusion that the formal code promulgated by Moses cannot, as a law, be binding upon the Christian." His view is based upon the authority of St. Paul through the whole argument of the Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians.

In all these cases the main ground of dissent from the common faith of the historic Church is found in certain utterances

* McClintock & Strong Cyclop., *sub voce*.

† Dr. L. Wood's translation, pp. 413-414.

of the Apostle Paul, which, it must be confessed, do seem at first sight to overthrow the entire Decalogue. He affirms repeatedly that believers "are not under law" (Rom. vi. 14, 15; Gal. v. 18); that they "were made dead to the law" (Rom. vii. 14); that they "are discharged from the law" (Rom. vii. 6); that the law has been "abolished" (Eph. ii. 15); and that it has come to "an end" (Rom. x. 4). Yet formidable as these sayings look, we unhesitatingly affirm that they do not and cannot mean that the law is abrogated.

1. The very nature of the law forbids such an assumption. The moral law simply expresses the will of God as to the conduct of men in the relations they hold in the present life. That will is grounded in the divine nature. Accordingly the law is simply a transcript of the perfections of God, commanding what is inherently and absolutely right, and forbidding what is inherently and absolutely wrong. How then can it possibly be changed or abrogated? Such a course of proceeding would imply a change of the Infinite Mind, of Him who sees the end from the beginning, and is the same yesterday, to-day and forever; which is clearly inconceivable. It is insisted, therefore, that a divine rule of a moral kind, in respect to human relations, is strictly incapable of change so long as those relations subsist. Whatever, then, the varied expressions of Paul may mean, they cannot mean that the law has ceased to be the expression of the divine will and must give way to something else.

2. The Apostle expressly contradicts such an interpretation of his words. At one stage in his great argument in Romans in favor of justification by faith, he asks the question (iii. 31): "Do we then make the law of none effect through faith? God forbid. Nay, we establish the law." His answer is indignant. So far from abrogating the law, his doctrine confirms it, upholding its dignity as the expression of God's holy will, and securing its constant fulfillment by the believer. To the same effect are the Apostle's other references to the subject. In giving moral directions to the Romans (xiii. 8-10) he commends love as "the fulfilling of the law." He quotes the sixth, the

seventh, the eighth and the tenth command, and then adds: "If there be any other commandment it is summed up in this word, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Could there be a more explicit assertion of the continuing validity of the Ten Words? So afterwards, in writing to the Ephesians (ii. 11), he confirms his directions to children to obey their parents by quoting at length the fifth precept, calling it a chief commandment with a promise added. How could it give any effect to his directions to add the injunction of an abrogated law? The whole course of the great Apostle, and his incidental references to the words from Sinai, show that he did not for a moment consider those words as recalled and abolished, but rather viewed them as the acknowledged standard of human duty. His contention was that the law as a means of justification was at an end, for all men are sinners, and being such the law must needs condemn them. It cannot possibly acquit them. And any who expect the favor of God on the ground of their obedience, are building their house upon the sand. The hope they cherish is as unsubstantial as a spider's web.

3. Our Lord recognized the authority of the Ten Words in very distinct and positive terms. In the Sermon on the Mount He expressly said (Matt. v. 17), that He was not come to destroy (*i. e.*, to abrogate) the law or the prophets, but to fulfill them, *i. e.*, to develop their principles to greater completeness, to go farther in the same direction, to make explicit what was already implicitly contained in these statutes. And, after illustrating his purpose in reference to several particular precepts, and setting aside the frigid and inept interpretation common among the Pharisees of that day, He summed up the rule of human intercourse in the golden words: "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them;" and then, as if to prevent any from thinking that He was announcing a novel principle, immediately added the words, "For this is the law and the prophets," *i. e.*, this is the meaning of the Ten Words as expounded in the rest of the Old Testament. In like manner when, in answer to the lawyer's question (Matt. xxii.

35), He gave the wonderful compendium of human duty in the two precepts: "Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, with all thy heart, and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," he added the words, "On these two commandments hangeth the whole law and the prophets," which show that He was not proposing a substitute for the ancient Decalogue, but a convenient summary of its contents. So, again, when another lawyer, as Luke tells us (x. 25), stood up and tempted Him, saying, "Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?" the answer was prompt: "What is written in the law? How readest thou?" We may justly claim that there could not be a more emphatic testimony to the continuing authority of the Decalogue. And when, at another time, a certain rich young ruler came eagerly propounding the same question (Mark x. 17), the answer was the same: "Thou knowest the commandments," and the Master proceeded to specify some of the second table, putting it beyond doubt that these precepts as moral obligations were specifically different from those of the Levitical ceremonial. And, as with the Decalogue as a whole, so with its individual parts. The law of the Sabbath was explained and vindicated from the absurd and trifling literalism of the Pharisees, and at the same time established as of perpetual validity. In like manner, when Christ rebuked the Pharisees for teaching that it was a higher duty for a son to devote his substance as an offering to God than to apply it to the support of his parents (Matt. xv. 3-6), He sustained the Fifth Commandment by His serious charge, "Ye have made void the word of God because of your traditions." Our Lord set aside the distinction of clean and unclean foods (Mark vii. 14-22), and many of the traditions of the people; but nowhere did He give any intimation of a purpose to set aside or alter the Ten Words, but, on the contrary, sanctioned them in whole and in part as the acknowledged and ultimate rule of human duty. If He did mean to abrogate their authority, surely He would have done so in plain, unequivocal words. Yet, on the contrary, every reference He made to them either says or implies that their force continues without any abatement.

4. The words of the Apostle do not have the meaning that is usually put upon them. This is certain from the circumstances of the case, as made apparent in his teaching.

The Old Dispensation was founded upon the promise made to Abraham, and renewed to Isaac and Jacob. Centuries afterward the law was given from Sinai as the directory of life and conduct. Upon these two factors the religious development of Israel proceeded. Both were needed, and both were used. One enkindled hope and encouraged trust; the other enlightened conscience and warded off presumption. The assurance of the divine mercy which shines out in psalm and prophecy was made a help to godly living. Hence the utterance, "There is forgiveness with Thee that Thou mayest be feared." Pardon was inseparably associated with a new heart and a right spirit. Hence the holy men whose lives illustrate the Old Testament. But in the time of our Lord, while there were those, such as Simeon, Anna and the family at Bethany, who followed in the footsteps of their pious forefathers, the people as a whole had gone astray. Their leaders had forgotten the covenant of promise or turned it into a pledge of their superiority to all other nations; and had devised a minute and laborious system of legal observances by which they thought they could secure the favor of Heaven. Their boast and confidence were in the law ceremonial as well as moral, by which they were so broadly distinguished from all their fellow-men. And even after any of them had been converted and had confessed Christ as the Son of God and the Saviour of His people, they were prone to lay undue stress upon Mosaic ordinances and insist that these were alike binding upon all Gentile believers. Thus they made the Christian confession a yoke of bondage and renounced the glorious liberty of the children of God. They made God's favor the reward of merit, and not an act of free grace. They worshiped the letter of the law and neglected its spirit. They habitually thought that God was their debtor and heaven their just due. Thus they eliminated all the gracious features of the ancient economy and made salvation a matter of bargain.

Now against this preposterous inversion of right principle the Apostle waged constant war. He firmly maintained the excellence and validity of the law as an expression of God's will, saying that the commandment is holy, just and good, and on occasion, appealing to it, as we have seen, as an authority on all points of duty. Yet in view of man's condition as a fallen creature, destitute of any self-recovering power, he held that the law operates disastrously. It could and did hold up the rule of duty, but it could not impart the disposition or the ability to obey. The contrast between it and the Gospel in this respect is well expressed in the compendious statement: "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life" (2 Cor. iii. 6). The letter, *i. e.*, the law, killeth. How does it kill? By commanding perfect obedience: "The man that doeth the righteousness which is of the law shall live thereby" (Rom. x. 5, R. V.). But no man does this righteousness—nay, every one falls far short of it. And therefore the law condemns him. It pronounces upon him the sentence of death. Besides, it kills by its awakening the conscience, for "through the law cometh the knowledge of sin" (Rom. iii. 20). It holds up the standard of moral obligation, and the soul, which before had been steeped in the lethargy of indifference, suddenly becomes aroused, and beholds how far off it is from righteousness, and how justly it is exposed to the wrath of a holy God. How often, in every age of the Church, has there been renewed in the experience of individuals what the Apostle tells of himself: "I was alive apart from the law once; but when the commandment came sin revived, and I died, and the commandment which was unto life, this I found to be unto death." He was slain by the holy and spotless law, because it revealed to him the number and the grossness of his sins. Still further, the law slays by its exasperating power. It not only creates and intensifies the consciousness of sin, but stimulates transgression. Man is disposed to regard as good whatever is prohibited, merely because it is prohibited. Frequent thinking of an object which is regarded as a gratification is very apt to stir the desire; and

the fact that it is forbidden increases the longing. So certain and common is this experience of the power of the law, at times, to excite latent sin, that it has been distinctly recognized by the heathen.* And there is at least a hint to the same effect in the utterance of the temptress in Solomon's proverb (ix. 17), "Stolen waters are sweet, and bread eaten in secret is pleasant." Here, then, is the law displaying the nature of sin and awakening the sense of obligation; but so far from enabling a man to conform to it, it further excites his desire for the forbidden thing, and so occasions a fearful discord in the soul.

Now it is to the exaggerated and mistaken notions cherished by the Jews of his time as to the place of the law in the matter of a sinner's justification that the Apostle refers in the passages that have been cited as proving that he held that its validity had ceased. That the exact contrary is true will appear on a closer inspection of the context in each case.

1. We are said to have been "discharged from the law" (Rom. viii. 6). The whole passage reads thus: "For when we were in the flesh (or unconverted state) the sinful passions which were through the law (*i. e.*, excited by it), wrought in our members to bring forth fruit unto death. But now we have been discharged from the law, having died (in Christ) to that wherein we were holden." Now this simply means that we no longer look for escape from the curse through our own obedience to the law; we are discharged from everything of that kind, because we are united to Christ, who Himself satisfied all claims by His death. And now, freed from a legal and slavish spirit, and introduced into a new and gracious state, we lead a life whose animating spirit is not fear, but love and gratitude. Hence the obedience rendered is spontaneous and genial, the result not of a spasmodic and violent struggle, but of an in-

* Livy (xxxiv. 4) Cato says: "*Nolite eodem loco existimare, Quirites, futuram rem, quo fuit, antequam lex de hoc ferretur.*"

Horace (Carm. i. 3): "*Audax omnia perpeti*

Gens humana ruit per vetitum nefas."

Ovid (Amor. iii. 4): "*Nititur in vetitum semper, cupimusque negata.*"

Seneca (De Clem. i. 23): "*Parricida cum lege cuperunt.*"

ward inclination, drawn out by the beauty and excellence of the divine law. See Pa. cxix. 97, 129, 162. But this does not, and cannot, mean that the law has ceased to be a norm of moral obligation; on the contrary, its appropriateness and validity are more distinctly recognized than ever. But conformity to its precepts has ceased to be the condition of man's salvation. Christ's active and passive obedience, His absolute holiness and His endurance of the penalty have discharged His people from the necessity of securing deliverance as the reward of good works. If saved at all they are saved by the gracious act of God, and their obedience henceforth is a grateful return for the favor already shown to them. The wages of sin is death, but eternal life is the gift of God—not in any sense earned, but a pure gratuity.

2. Again, we are said (Rom. vi. 14) to be "not under law." This strong expression is to be interpreted by the connection, where the question is as to the justification of the sinner. He is not under the law—that is, dependent upon it for acceptance with God. If he were, his condition would be hopeless, for who can claim entire freedom from sin, past and present? Who can say that in heart, speech and behaviour he has always conformed to all God's commandments? The joy of the believer in Christ is that he is not under a legal dispensation which requires absolute personal conformity to every precept as the indispensable condition of acceptance; but, on the contrary, is under a gracious dispensation, according to which God, for Christ's sake, accepts the sinner as a sinner without works or merit of his own. All the merit as a ground of justification lies in the redeeming work of Christ. But this does not even remotely imply any change in the standard of moral duty. That continues unalterably the same. It is as unchangeable as its divine Author.

3. In like manner the Apostle says (Rom. vii. 4): "Ye were made dead to the law through the body of Christ." This means through this body as slain and offered as a propitiatory sacrifice. Christ died in our stead, and in His death we are put to

death. He bore our sins in His own body on the tree, furnishing a complete satisfaction to all the claims of the law. Hence we are made dead to it. It indeed continues to bind us as rational creatures, but it no longer prescribes the conditions of safety and peace. As to these, we have been put to death in the vicarious death of our blessed Lord. Our union to Him secures this happy result. We have no more to do with the law as a means of justification than a corpse has, but having been raised up with Christ as the living and life-giving Son of God, we bear fruit unto holiness. The secret of sanctifying, as well as of justifying grace, is given in the Apostle's words in Second Corinthians (v. 21): "Him who knew no sin He made to be in sin on our behalf, that we might become the righteousness of God in Him."

4. To the same effect the Apostle speaks of the law as abolished. Christ is said (Eph. ii. 15) to have "abolished in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments contained in ordinances." But how was this done? Did our Lord abrogate the Ten Words as no more expressing the duties of intelligent, responsible creatures? Certainly not. The abolition is of the same sort as we have noticed before, that is, *in his flesh*, words which here can mean only His atoning death, which satisfied justice, and thus effected reconciliation. This great sacrifice, by meeting all the demands of the law, did it away as a condition of salvation. The special reference is to the Mosaic law as a whole, in all its compass and in all its forms. Excellent and authoritative as it may be, and neither the Old Testament nor the New spares any pains to set forth its exalted worth, it is utterly done away as a rule of justification. No man ever has been, or ever will be, saved by his obedience to the commandments. That door into life is closed forever, but a new one is opened through the rent veil of the Redeemer's flesh. And they who enter by this new and living way are zealous to perform good works, not as their title to God's favor, but as a thankful return for the favor already secured through the blood of the everlasting covenant.

5. In the same way is to be explained the passage which speaks of the law as terminated (Rom. x. 4); "Christ is the end of the law unto righteousness to every one that believeth." The Greek word here rendered *end* may have one of three senses, viz., that of literal termination, or that of fulfillment, or that of aim or object; and each of these three admits of justification. For Christ terminated the law in the sense already explained; and He also fulfilled it by satisfying its preceptive and its penal demands; and besides, He was the object at which it aimed and to which it led. Some interpreters (Vaughan, Shedd) unite all these explanations; but the better way, and one more in accordance with the connection, is (with the Greek expositors, and Bengel, Tholuck, Riddle, *et al.*) to take the word in the sense of object. The law's aim was to make men righteous, and it did this by shutting them up to faith in Christ. The grievous error of the Jews, to whom Paul is referring, was in rejecting Christ and endeavoring to set up a righteousness of their own, whereas if they rightly considered the purpose of the law they would learn that it pointed continually to Christ, in whom alone every one that believes attains righteousness.

But there is one passage in Paul's Epistles which sets forth with special clearness his view of the position of the law in the sinner's justification: "For what the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and, as an offering for sin, condemned sin in the flesh; that the ordinance of the law might be fulfilled in us who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit" (Rom. viii. 3). Here we have a lucid statement of what it was impossible for the law to do. It could not condemn sin, and, at the same time, save the sinner. The former was its proper office, the latter was out of its power. This powerlessness was not owing to any deficiency in itself, but to the weakness of sinful human nature. If men would comply with its righteous demands, all would be well. Were they free from depravity, its perfect exhibition of the will of God would avail to maintain and advance them in holiness. But, alas, they are all under sin—victims of its guilt

and power—and therefore the law is impotent to save. All that it can do is to condemn. In this emergency God provided a remedy by sending His own Son, and sending Him in the likeness of sinful flesh; not in sinful flesh, for then He would not have been “the holy thing” which we know that He was, but in the likeness of it, *i. e.*, subject to all the infirmities which sin had introduced. The purpose for which He was sent was for sin, or as an offering for sin, *i. e.*, as a piacular sacrifice. The result was that thus God condemned sin in the flesh—that is, condemned it in the nature which His Son had assumed. In and by means of His humanity the Lord Jesus endured the judicial infliction which God the Father visited upon the sinner’s Substitute. Thus was accomplished what the law was utterly unable to do. It could teach, warn, guide and stimulate, but it could not raise up the fallen or recover the lost. It could not expiate sin nor throw off the burden of guilt. But this the Gospel does, and at the same time secures holiness of heart and life. For the purpose is to have the requisitions of the law, both in penalty and in precept, fulfilled in the believer; and accordingly the recipients of this great blessing are persons who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit, *i. e.*, who lead a pious life, though not a sinless and perfect one. These persons could not obey the law in the strength of a fallen nature, but they have grace to obey in the strength of an accomplished redemption and under the influence of the Holy Ghost.

III.

THE BISHOPS' PASTORAL LETTER.*

BY REV. A. B. KREMER, D.D.

A LETTER addressed by the House of Bishops of the Protestant Episcopal Church to the lower orders and laity may be taken for granted to be of importance. The bishops are supposed to be the custodians of the doctrines, orthodoxy and spiritual interests of the Christian body or denomination of which they are the chief representatives. They are the overseers of one branch of the Church catholic; and when at any time they unite in addressing those under their superintendence, we may assume that they were led to do so for good reason.

What strikes us as something out of the ordinary in the letter is that the subjects which the bishops felt constrained to present, and to discuss and defend, are certain fundamental Christian doctrines universally received throughout orthodox Christendom. The remarkable fact is here disclosed that heresies have crept into the Episcopal household affecting both clergy and laity, heresies of a serious character, involving departures from the most fundamental and central Christian doctrines—namely, on the Person of Christ and the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. This is evident from what is said in the beginning of the letter, where it is affirmed that the bishops were convened in solemn council to consider their duty, “in view of certain novelties of opinion and expression which have seemed to us to be subversive of the fundamental verities of Christ’s religion. It has come to our knowledge that the minds of many of the

* “Pastoral Letter. Issued by the Bishops of the Protestant Episcopal Church, October 18, 1894.”

faithful clergy and laity are disturbed and distressed by these things, and we desire to comfort them by a firm assurance that the episcopate of the Church, to which, in a peculiar manner, the deposit of faith has been entrusted, is not unfaithful to that sacred charge, but will guard and keep it with all diligence, as men who shall hereafter give account to God."

This is strong language, first, as a declaration that new and false doctrines are maintained to an alarming extent within the Episcopalian fold, affecting presbyters, deacons, and laymen; and, second, that the bishops, realizing the importance and dangers of the situation, will use their authority and energies in removing, if possible, all errors that have crept in, and in maintaining the integrity of the Christian faith and doctrine in accordance with the word of God, the early creeds, and the standards of the Episcopal Church.

The pastoral letter calls attention to what all orthodox Christians regard as two great cardinal points or verities in the Christian system—the Person of Christ as the God Incarnate, and the Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. This is surely a surprising fact, in view of the occasion which called forth the deliverance; surprising that the episcopate of that historic and venerable Christian organization finds it necessary to rehearse into the ears of clergy and laity the familiar lessons of the old orthodox symbols of faith. The questions here discussed were settled fifteen centuries ago, and have been firmly held and maintained ever since by the historic Catholic Church in all its branches. And yet the Church, which lays claim to apostolic succession through her episcopate, finds it necessary to restate the old forms of sound words which include the most vital truths of the Christian religion, in order to correct a dangerous tendency among clergy and laity to repudiate them. What is the matter with those highly favored clergy, who seem to have departed from the sound doctrine of those apostolic men through whose hands alone (forsooth) they could receive the grace and benediction of God for the work of the ministry?

There must be some cause for such defection, which may

appear to be this or that to different minds, some occasion or influence back of such decay of faith in the minds and hearts of Episcopal churchmen.

But before we proceed farther on this point, it will be well to notice again that the bishops present the old doctrines concerning Christ, His person and work of redemption, just the same as if they were teaching new disciples and seeking to ground them in the essential principles and truths of Christianity. Their statements of these vital points are all that could be desired by those holding the catholic faith; and if all their clergy and laity were in full sympathy with the doctrines as thus presented, there would not be a more orthodox denomination of Christians in the world. As it is, however, according to the bishops' own statement, the orthodoxy of the episcopate cannot be asserted of the other clergy and laity as a whole.

And why such a state of things in the Episcopal Church? May it not be, first, owing to the fact that too much account has been made by her of apostolic succession? The doctrine of a historical tactual succession from the apostles through her bishops, and through them exclusively, has been diinned into the ears of her people unceasingly, creating in them the comfortable and self-satisfying feeling that they are the church people *par excellence*, and that all other Protestant bodies are irregular, lacking, therefore, in the historic life of the true apostolic Church. Such a notion, living and stirring constantly in their minds, would not tend to growth in the solid and pure Christian graces of faith, hope, and charity. It would tend rather to formality, pride, and lofty self-conceit; and from these the descent to heterodoxy is *facilis descensus*, easy and natural enough. The bishops, whose superior piety was one of the chief reasons of their elevation to the high office and order, realizing their responsibility as the chief doctors of the Church have held fast the form of sound words, and so also many others whose loyalty and Christian piety have kept them from falling; but it may be that a large number have had only the outward and visible glory of a great church organization to keep them

in the old and catholic Christian faith, and that has proved to be insufficient. And no wonder at all, seeing that the letter killeth, and that the spirit only giveth life. In what is chiefly form, however important in itself and religiously grand it may be, there is nothing to insure stability in those personal Christian qualities which alone are of any real value. On the contrary, intense belief in one's self, or in one's branch of the Church as *the* Church, and as having the only true order and right to exist, has surely not very far to go to reach the wilderness of skepticism and unbelief, or of those novelties of which our worthy prelates speak as having taken the place of the verities of the Christian religion. The old Jewish exclusiveness rather aided than prevented the formation of heretical parties. The self-assertion and high claims of the Pharisees could not prevent the formation of such sects as the Sadducees and others of no better faith. The higher the walls of separation from outsiders, the greater the desire and effort to leap over them. So in the Episcopal Church, exclusiveness, which would seem to insure a unity of faith among the membership, has proved to be not only powerless in this respect, but even powerful to effect the opposite result; an illustration that in Christianity, as in other things, the formal and external cannot (except apparently and for a time) control and confine the living and thinking soul within. Outward visible authority, high formal claims and pretensions, and æsthetic ritualism, prove to be of no avail and no defence when the citadel of faith is threatened and attacked by either secret or open forms of unbelief and heresy.

Not the least thing to be noted in the Bishops' Letter is the conspicuous absence of allusion to the one great claim of the Episcopal Church—Apostolic Succession. For once at least this rock, if not discovered to be loose sand, has been found utterly incapable of supporting the heterogeneous mass of materials in the artistic superstructure reared upon it. To hold these together and in the ancient apostolic faith, the bishops were compelled to resort to the Word of God and the orthodox traditions of our common catholic Christianity. To these, and not to exclusive Episcopal claims, the appeal is made.

Another cause of defection from the orthodox faith in that church is doubtless to be found in the social life that prevails within the denomination. While it includes persons of every class and condition, yet it is well known to be chiefly a church of the higher ranks of society. It rules largely in the social world. So-called society people are easily at home in the Episcopal Church. A great deal of time is spent there in conducting and training in the formalities of social life. There is no doubt that Christianity is the greatest refiner of people's manners, and that social culture and refinement are more indebted to it than to anything else; yet it is also true that such culture is the chief part of the religion of some churches or congregations. A church may flourish like a green bay tree, nourished chiefly by the elements of the world. The Church of Laodicea is an example. Of the same kind are many still, especially where wealth and social culture are supreme. Then religion is chiefly an outward adornment, and made to be so especially by the aids and fine touches which wealth can give. Now what motive or influence is strong enough to keep people thus environed in the narrow path of the Christian orthodoxy as represented by catholic creeds and traditions? Where religion is chiefly an ornament, the rough wooden cross having been changed by the fine hand of modern culture into gold studded with the brightest of earth's gems, there seems to be no potent reason why some of those old doctrines might not be hewn off some of their rough places and be made to conform to the enlightenment of this most enlightened age. The beauty of Zion would not thereby suffer, and the dignity of refined humanity would not then revolt against doctrines no longer suited to the advanced ideas of the present time. To the refined Greeks the doctrine of the cross was foolishness, and they were only anticipating the wisdom of their kind of the present closing century. The bishops say that dangerous novelties have taken the place of the old doctrines; and St. Paul found that the Athenians were of the same disposition. The social life of Athens could not submit to the humiliating demands of the

Christian doctrine as presented by a greater than Demosthenes on Mars Hill, and our modern Episcopal brethren—so their bishops testify—seem to be engaged in changing and improving the old gospel by introducing novelties that are subversive of the apostolic faith.

Is not refined worldliness in a measure responsible for all this? Is not *that* a root of bitterness that is corrupting the fountains of the waters of spiritual life? That and the other mentioned (the two having much in common) may have chiefly made all this trouble in the Episcopal Church, and caused the humiliating spectacle of a council of bishops convened for the express purpose of calling back clergy and laity from the strange pastures of unbelief. Other causes there may be; but two of them, we think, are found.

In precisely what particulars the Episcopal clergy have transgressed is not directly stated; but we may infer that departures have been made on some precious beliefs concerning Christ, His person and work. At least certain clergy have indulged in "novelties of opinion and expression" of such character as seemed to the bishops "to be subversive of the fundamental verities of Christ's religion." This would seem to mean, if it means anything, that these clergy have broken their ordination vows by virtually rejecting the ancient catholic creeds in their inmost essence. This is further shown in the letter by the declarations of the bishops on the Incarnation and related topics, evidently implying that the necessity had arisen, through clerical defection from the true doctrine, for a re-statement of what the historic, catholic Church has always and everywhere taught and believed.

The other cardinal doctrine to which the bishops call attention is: The Holy Scriptures as the inspired Word of God—by which the catholic faith is proved.

It is not at all strange that wrong views on the person and work of Christ should be followed by erroneous conceptions of what constitutes the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, and *vice versa*. So, as we infer from the Pastoral Letter, the "nov-

elties of opinion and expression" pertain also to this; for otherwise there would have been no need for admonition in such earnest and vigorous language on what has always been well understood and believed by the Church.

Aside from the occasion which has called forth this encyclical, the deliverance on this subject is interesting, though presenting nothing new at all, but simply restating in an earnest way what all orthodox Christians have substantially believed. But we cannot separate in our minds this deliverance from the occasion of it; and that is, that there has been defection in the Episcopal Church from the ancient faith in the inspiration of the Scriptures. Just what particular errors on this subject have been held and taught we are not informed in the letter; but that they are serious, and not to be passed by, the letter itself is proof.

What is the remedy for the evils thus looming up and threatening to overturn the very foundations of Christianity? The Bishops offer the remedy in their truly Christian appeal to clergy and laity. It is an affectionate exhortation to return to sound doctrine, and a strong assurance to the faithful that their guardians, the Bishops, will hold fast the form of sound words, and defend them against all opposition. All which is very kind and gracious to both the faithful and the offending brethren; but what becomes of the authority that used to be asserted by the episcopate of that Church? For much smaller offences clergymen were disciplined, punished, suspended, and deposed from the ministry. It is still fresh in our memories that a prominent, able and zealous rector in one of our great cities was promptly silenced by his bishop for the single offence of omitting, for conscience' sake, a word in the baptismal office. The suspended rector's orthodoxy was first-class as compared with that of the clergy whose "novelties" are causing the bishops so much trouble. Recently a presbyter was suspended for preaching heresy; but he was so bold and so anxious to obtain notoriety that his episcopal superiors could not overlook his fault without stultifying themselves. It would then almost

seem as if the smallest infractions of the prescribed ritual were more surely punishable in the Episcopal Church than "damnable heresies," as St. Peter expresses it; for certainly no one reading the Bishop's pastoral could see in it the least intimation of penal discipline for those who have been wagging their tongues uttering words and opinions "subversive of the fundamental verities of Christ's religion." It may perhaps be true, as often affirmed, that Episcopalians can believe what they please provided they hold as sacred and inviolable, in whole and in part, the grand externals of their Church. The shrine seems to be to them of more account than that which it enshrines.

The situation is interesting, and may perhaps be better appreciated by some by supposing the same condition to exist in our own Reformed Church. Suppose a dozen, more or less, of classes stirred up by such "novelties of opinion and expression," presented an overture to the General Synod, asking that body to make a declaration on the two doctrinal topics—the same as discussed by the Episcopal Bishops. The overture, as supposed, affirms that the expressions of ministers complained of seem "to be subversive of the fundamental verities of Christ's religion," and also, "that the minds of many of the faithful clergy and laity are disturbed and distressed by these things." The General Synod, as an answer to the memorial, would perhaps issue a strong pastoral letter; but, whether it would or not, it would not fail to command the several classes concerned to present specific charges against each individual offending and cite him for trial, the offence as charged being, in general, uttering sentiments "subversive of the fundamental verities of Christ's religion." Any other course would be inconceivable. There would be no hedging nor trimming, no uncertain voice from the supreme authority in the Church, but an emphatic command that must be obeyed. As if the General Synod would say: In essentials there must be unity; there is plenty of room for self-constituted and self-willed teachers elsewhere; the world is large, and there are always enough easy-going worldlings that flourish the Christian name ever ready to follow them. But the

historic Catholic Church has no use for theological vagrants. Let them wander and die in the wilderness; the promised land is for the Joshuas and Calebs, who walk not by sight, but by faith, who indeed use reason and knowledge wherever and however obtained, but not as against the catholic consciousness of the Church as expressed in her œcumenical symbols.

It has been hinted somewhere that the strong language of the Bishops does not properly represent the facts in the case. That would be bad for those dignitaries, if the charge were true. But they are certainly a highly responsible party, and their words must be allowed to stand until they are disproved. We are not dealing now with newspaper squibs, or the irresponsible utterances of careless writers, but with the deliberate declarations of a House of Bishops in council assembled. We have a right to take them at their word, and to assume that they know whereof they speak. Our own observations, as here presented, are based strictly on what they say, and not on what we may think they should have said. Any other treatment of their pronouncement would be disrespectful toward men of such high dignity, piety and learning. It should be regarded as next to impossible that loose and unguarded statements should emanate from a body of men occupying the highest place of authority in one of the leading branches of Christ's Church.

It would seem, then, that the Protestant Episcopal Church is in a rather sad plight. The existence of her three divisions of High, Broad and Low, has given her some trouble, at times, but that has not touched the substance of what is most dear to the heart of a true Christian believer, and therefore has been no great disturbing element—nothing at all to cause the distress of which the bishops speak in the letter. But the existence of fundamental doctrinal error is a most serious matter. In her present unhappy situation, this advice might perhaps with propriety be given: Come down from your high pedestal of Protestant exclusiveness, and remove your Chinese wall separating you from Christian denominations as old and respectable as your own; cease talking about the historic episcopate, as if

there were no other true form of church government, and as if the grace of holy orders flowed only through the hands of diocesan bishops; try to remember that three centuries ago your bishops and other clergy walked in brotherly fellowship, and took counsel with Reformed ministers of Switzerland, and never questioned the validity of their presbyterial ordination; moreover, waste less time on Church millinery, and toggery, and style; let faith and piety, rather than wealth, culture and social eminence be the leading feature and test of true church membership; and use the time that would be thus wasted in building Christian character and Zion on the immovable foundation of the faith once delivered to the saints, rather than on an exclusive churchism. Do this, and your recent letter will appear the more consistent; for which we will then more heartily thank you.

It may be noted here that in regard to the inspiration of the Scriptures the bishops do not insist on or plead for any particular theory, whether old or new, but only on maintaining the thing itself, substantially as taught in the Articles of Religion. They even say they are not presenting their individual private views on the subject, and plainly hint that they themselves are not of one mind on it. We would *know* this to be so, if the late Bishop Brooks were still one of them. Indeed the letter carefully avoids any discussion of special theories on either of the subjects named, and allows large liberty in this regard. It insists that there should be unity on the settled dogmas of the Church, but allows full liberty to all to say how or in what sense they would interpret the language in which the dogmas are formulated. This may be sufficiently satisfactory to some who have been indulging in "novelties of expression," and perhaps non-committal enough for all concerned. In this respect the letter resembles the queen's speech, which usually glitters with generalities so general and broad that it embraces, in a most harmless way, all the politics and all the parties, notions and fancies of the vast British empire. And so, like the government of Great Britain, the American Episcopate will probably

tide over its present difficulties for a time ; but of the future, who can tell ? Still, the omens of evil in that branch of the Church need not alarm, very much, the rest of Christendom, as it is, after all, only one star on the broad, luminous expanse of the Church universal.

So also the pastoral letter does not discuss the question whether theology as a science is fixed once for all and complete, or whether there is room here for progress and discovery, as in any other science. As already noted, we are left to infer that the fatherly counsel of the bishops is not meant to interfere with free theological investigation, nor to discourage it in any way. It would be useless, in our day, at any rate, and quite behind the age, to insist on uniformity of statement in theology, as in a fundamental creed, or to assert that the last word has been said on the dogmas and facts of Christianity. It seems strange that, while Protestants have never been in the habit of holding up their hands in holy horror over the fact that affiliating denominations have always held differing views on some important doctrinal points, and regard it all with the utmost composure, or even indifference, they yet, many of them, raise a loud lamentation at the mere suggestion of advanced ideas in theology. If different schools of theology differ, according to the difference between the denominations which they represent, why should they not improve and make progress ? Is not that really the only way for the various branches of Christ's Church to meet and unite in a universal Christian consensus ? How are the Lord's hosts to meet thus, if they remain stationary and satisfied with the old shibboleths of sect and party ? If the forward movements are real and genuine there will be a meeting-place in due time ; for the progress of truth is ever Christ-ward, and in Him is the place of the union of Christendom.

But neither can that glorious summit be reached if the old foundations are removed. A false advance must result in a fatal descent. A house built on sand must fall. Such an apparent movement upward is, in reality, a falling back to the

Arianism and other destructive errors condemned by the word and Spirit of God, and by the Church, which is "the pillar and ground of the truth." The last word has not been said even on the great essentials ; new light will yet be shed upon them ; but that does not invalidate the principle that in essentials there must be unity. Without this the body of Christ is divided. There can be no true catholicity without essential unity.

By this it is not meant, however, as already remarked, that the end has been reached in the right apprehension of the ground principles of Christianity. The history of Christian doctrine proves the contrary. For example, the Church moved forward steadily on the doctrine of the Atonement, the age of Anselm witnessing a new and better theory from that which preceded, and this again, modified by more advanced thought in the centuries following, on to the present time. The substance remains, the foundations are not destroyed ; on the contrary, they have been more and more cleared of the dust and rubbish of misconception, so that the doctrine is now, as may be necessarily supposed, nearer the perfect truth than it has ever been. So of any other Christian doctrine. But surely opinions and declarations that are "subversive of Christ's religion," as the bishops express it, cannot be in the path of true progress, and can have no rightful place in the teaching Church ; and the pastors who feed their flocks with such chaff, or poison, should be dealt with by the proper authorities with no more ceremony than is decent and proper.

Meanwhile true and godly theologians will go on thinking. They will refuse to move in a rut, or to be bound and limited by human traditions, however venerable, and will assert their right to draw from the original sources, to be guided by sanctified reason, philosophy and the divine Spirit, whose guidance is theirs as well as the early Fathers who laid the formal dogmatic foundations of the Church. They are in better position than were the patristic theologians for developing the system of Christian doctrine, from its early seed form, and, being under the same divine influence, there seems to be no reason why

their inspiration should not be equal to that of the Fathers. They will hold firmly to the ancient Catholic faith on the settled dogmas of the Church, including the divine inspiration of the Holy Scriptures ; but they will also use the increased advantages which they have, in an age of new and clearer light, for the still better and more edifying presentation of "the glorious Gospel of the blessed God."

The limits of this review will not permit discussion of other matters treated of in the Bishops' Letter. We have confined ourselves to the two leading subjects to which everything else is subordinate and corollate, and of interest chiefly for those to whom the letter is addressed. It would not be in place here to remark on what are strictly family matters in the Episcopal Church. But all Christians are interested in the main points of the letter ; and we may here conclude with the following earnest words contained in it :

"A great danger may beset the flock of Christ, not merely from false teaching, but through injudicious and ill-timed teaching, the effect of which is not to settle and confirm, but to undermine and weaken faith. This danger exists, and, unless it shall be conscientiously avoided by every teacher of the Church, the coming generations may live to see 'a famine in the land, not a famine of bread, nor a thirst for water, but of hearing the words of the Lord.'"

IV.

THE SEVEN INTELLECTUAL WONDERS OF THE WORLD.

BY AUSTIN BIERBOWER.

THE greatest problems of Science are the starting points in nature, where things and processes begin, or the points of passage from one thing to another. They are the Rubicons where the fates of theories, philosophies, religions and sciences are settled. The starting point being given, a whole system, in each case, follows, and it is the chief work of investigation in this century to settle the facts regarding these starting points. They are few, so that their consideration is practicable, and they deserve at this stage of science a concentration of thought upon them. Their settlement will settle nearly all the other leading problems now agitating thinkers, each of which runs back at last to the question of an origin.

The beginnings which are thus the subjects of the world's perpetual problems are:—First: the beginning of existence, or creation; that is, the question of the origin of matter. Second: the beginning of motion, or of the process of development; that is, evolution, including the beginning of structural existence, or crystallization. Third: the beginning of vegetation, or passage from the inorganic to the organic. Fourth: the beginning of animal life, or the passage of the unconscious to the conscious. Fifth: the beginning of species, or passage from one kind of being to another. Sixth: the beginning of volition, or starting of action, through purpose; and Seventh: the beginning of a future life, or passage from this life to another.

These seven startings or beginnings embrace the problems

which engage perhaps more than any others the attention of the whole world, and promise to engage it in all ages, so that they may, from their magnitude, be called the seven intellectual wonders of the world. Popularly stated they may be expressed thus: First, I wonder if there is a God, or the question of creation as opposed to the hypothesis of the eternity of matter. Second, I wonder if there is a present design in nature, or the question of Providence as against a universality of law. Third, I wonder how life originated, or the question of spontaneous generation. Fourth, I wonder how thought was produced, or the question of how we come to know the external world. Fifth, I wonder if man was created in the image of God or descended from a monkey. Sixth, I wonder if the will is free or driven by fate; and Seventh, I wonder if there is a future life, or the question of immortality.

These questions all turn, as we have said, on the beginnings or startings. The thought of the scientific world is largely centered on points at which decisive changes occur, where a regular process ends, and a new departure is taken. It is a question, in the main, of self-origination or production from without—of spontaneous beginning, or effect from preceding forces.

The first of these beginnings, or starting points, is the origin of matter, or of the material of the world, that is, the starting out of nothing, or leap from non-existence into existence, which involves the question of creation; and on how this is settled depends that of the existence of God and a whole train of theology.

The question of the beginning of things may, of course, be evaded by assuming that they always existed, in which case we have no beginning to account for, but only modifications. The first question of a beginning, then, is, Was there a beginning?

It is as easy, perhaps, to conceive that the universe always existed as that it should commence to be, as easy to think of nature as in existence as to think of it as coming into existence.

Supposing, however, that it began, the next question is, Did an intelligent power produce it, or was there a spontaneous generation of the universe—the world coming into existence out of nothing, as the cell (on the development theory) comes into existence, or as each stage of the development comes about spontaneously? Was there a spontaneous creation as well as a spontaneous generation of plants and animals—a spontaneous coming into being as well as a spontaneous coming into life?

If things did not originate of themselves, but were produced by an intelligent power, the problem then is, how the intelligent power originated. For this intelligent power must have had a cause if other things must; since, if it can exist without a cause, the universality of cause is disproven, and things need have none. In other words, if God is eternal, things may be.

The only reconciliation of the two ideas—of an intelligent cause and of the eternity of the universe—is in the theory that the universe itself is intelligent, or includes intelligence in its components—a kind of Pantheism in which the intelligent whole evolves itself into the various forms now existing, that is, a creation by God out of Himself, instead of out of nothing, or His simple growth into existing things, God, force and law being, in some sense, one.

We have the fact of intelligence; and this fact must be taken into account in discussing this problem. The question, accordingly, is, Did this intelligence come from dead matter, or was there a prior intelligence which produced it? If it developed from matter, did a prior intelligence start that matter, or superintend its development into the subsequent intelligence, or mind? In other words, is intelligence a cause or an effect in nature?

This, then, is the first great problem of science—the origin of matter or of the materials of evolution.

The second great problem of science follows close upon this, and concerns the development of this matter. Having the matter, whether from eternity or otherwise, we have next to account for changes, in which we seek only proximate causes, or derive

each state out of the previous state, always preserving an equivalent in nature; so that the second great problem of science is the beginning of motion, or of evolution, and the cause of it.

As already stated, we can as easily conceive of nature as originally existing with motion and a tendency to develop as we can conceive of it as existing at all; that is, we can as easily conceive it to be developing matter as we can to be dead matter (without any properties or tendencies). We simply assume, on this supposition, that matter is a more potential substance than it was formerly supposed to be, something with more properties than extension, impenetrability, divisibility, etc.

It includes a power to self-organize, grow and become intelligent—if, indeed, it is not intelligent in itself. We must ignore the old distinction between mind and matter, wherein we assumed that the one did not include the other, but was an entirely different substance.

At all events, we find nature with certain properties and tendencies, undergoing certain changes; and the question is the cause of these changes—not necessarily the first cause, but the immediate cause. How did they come out of the previous state of nature?

The first of these changes observed is a tendency to develop, or (according to the nebular hypothesis) to form worlds, plants, animals, thought, social systems, etc. What caused nature to start on such a long career of evolution, ending at last in mind and its products?

The process is very simple when it has begun. We can explain by the law of gravitation and other laws the various changes; but what set the matter in motion or the laws to going?

Starting back as far as we can get in thought, we find the materials of the world in a gaseous state and in motion. What they were before they took such form is not known. They may have degenerated into such chaos from a former world or system of worlds, like the present, to which chaos this world may again return. We are simply left with the nebulous gas as our

starting point and the question of the cause of the motion. How did evolution start?

The impossibility of solving this question, or of going behind it, is simply that of the insolvability of the question of the origin of matter in the first place; though, like that, it leaves us with a much more animated matter than we had supposed ourselves to possess, or with a matter in a process, instead of a dead matter; and the question returns to an explanation of the process, or rather, now, of stages of the process.

While we cannot explain the whole process of evolution, but must take it as we take matter—as given to us; and while we cannot explain the absolute beginning of even a change in that process, but must confine ourselves to accounting for each stage by finding it in the preceding one, this second great problem of the world resolves itself into an explanation of the various stages of development; and the first of them is crystallization, where a new beginning appears in nature—the beginning of structural existence.

This second great problem of the world, then, resolves itself into the question, How does crystallization begin? What causes nature to form itself into structures, to take definite and beautiful shapes and to grow? We speak now of inorganic growth—crystals—and not of organic growth, of which we shall speak later in discussing the origin of plants and animals. The question now is, How do crystals originate? The explanation will go far to explain the formation of cells, and so of vegetable and animal life. For when nature begins spontaneously to build, there is no conceiving where it may not go. The beginning of crystallization, or first starting of nature out of formlessness into form, is one of the great questions of science as well as of philosophy, and one on which others of great weight depend.

Of course, nature has developed much before coming to crystals. It has formed itself into globes and moved orderly in circles and ellipses, and has taken other regular shapes in its forms and motions. It has fallen into the figures of geometry

and natural philosophy, and combined into many compounds of chemistry, making water, salt, rocks, continents and winds; and crystallization is a further development of this process, or one of the forms of action of matter in its geometrical and chemical movements and combinations. The question accordingly is, How do the particles arrange themselves spontaneously into such regular shapes, and by what particular power in nature? In other words, How does the crystal commence, and what makes it grow? Here is a turning-point in science—one of the great beginnings which the world can afford to stop and consider.

If a weak galvanic current is passed through a solution of nitrate of silver a number of molecules of oxygen and of silver unite together and aggregate into crystals of oxide of silver. If the process is continued, that is, if the galvanic current is kept passing through the solution, these crystals grow, like plants and animals, by the addition of other molecules to their sides, the new molecules always attaching themselves to the already formed crystals in such a way as to preserve their form and enlarge the whole. Large crystals are at length formed in this way. At the same time too that these first crystals are thus made to grow, new crystals also spring into existence in the solution, which also grow until the solution is full of crystals. Crystals are thus formed, and grow whenever certain elements come together in given proportions; and this coming together may take place spontaneously in nature as well as by design in the laboratory. Nothing is more common in nature than crystals; and in the laboratory we can produce many kinds out of many different elements. In any solution of salt, slowly evaporating, crystals will form, which slowly increase in size during the continued evaporation of the water. No seed or previous crystals are necessary, although crystals generally form more readily about existing crystals than spring new into existence. The great fact is that crystals under given conditions come into existence; that is, that nature takes on structural shapes and begins to grow, and grows into regular and beautiful forms. Just

what causes this movement is the great problem ; and if it were solved it would settle a host of others ; so it remains one of the greatest tasks of science to investigate the property of nature which starts into crystallization. Why do the particles of oxygen, for example, unite with the particles of silver in the solution above-named ? and why do they, when united, take the geometrical form ?

The uniting is merely a fact of chemistry. Certain elements coming together simply produce a compound with new properties, a resultant of the two. Thus oxygen and hydrogen produce water. So much of the question is easily answered. But what produces the symmetry of the structures when they are thus compounded ? Why do they take the shape of crystals ? This is the great problem of science.

There are, in the nature of things, only a few forms for bodies to take, as globes, cubes, rhomboids, and cones, and only a few movements for them to take, as straight lines, circles, and ellipses. Accordingly whenever there is a combination of particles they must take one or other of these forms, and move along one or other of these directions. When oxygen and hydrogen, for example, unite into water, the drop becomes globular, the surface becomes a plane, and other shapes are taken according to gravity and the various forces of attraction and lines of motion ; and if the materials, as oxide of silver or sugar, for example, are hardened when thus moving, they become fixed in such shape, and so are crystals. Crystallization is simply a uniting of particles according to the laws of chemistry and physics, and the growth of crystals is simply a continuation of this process.

Here, then, we have the beginning of growth or of structures in nature. The materials of the world take shape, and these shapes enlarge and multiply. Nature becomes organized. For crystallization is a kind of organism that will explain the corresponding action in organic nature (plants and animals). It is a start out of formless matter. It is, if not organic life, organic dead matter, or organism among minerals. Crystallization is mineral growth, a starting not of life or toward life, but of the

materials in a parallel process with life. Nature is here seen as no longer formless matter. It moves long before it is alive, and has an orderly career long before it feels or knows. It is as active as when it shows itself in plants and animals, and as minutely active as in thought. For nature is thus seen to have not only the great movements of worlds, winds, and rivers, but of particles in crystallization, with movements as geometric as those in the orbits of planets and the rays of light.

This leads us naturally to the next great process in nature, the formation of organic substances, or structures that have life. This is the passage of nature from the inorganic to the organic, or from dead to living matter; and, though crystallization throws much light upon the process as being a similar one, there is, nevertheless, here a great leap or change which requires special explanation. While vegetation is structural like crystals, there are fundamental differences; and the question is, How does inorganic matter pass to organic? or, How does life begin? The bridging of the chasm between inanimate and animate nature is a distinct problem of science; and, though crystallization, a parallel process, may help to explain it, it does not end in life. Crystals do not become plants. We must go back to formless inanimate matter, and try to see how life could originate out of it.

The next great problem, then, is the beginning of life, or passage of mineral matter into vegetable. How does the lifeless start to grow? How does dirt become a plant? On the solution of this question depend many others, which make it one of the perpetual world-problems. It is the question of spontaneous generation, on which men take two sides; and, according as they solve it one way or the other, they are divided along the whole line of scientific and philosophic questions, as well as of religious.

The first query is, whether there is any origination of life at all out of inanimate matter, or whether it was not originally created, and then handed down by seed. If we adopt the theory of creation, the inquiry is of course stopped, as no explanation

can be given of the supernatural, unless, indeed, we allow that it was created through the process of evolution, in which case the explanation is the same as if we suppose its production to be by natural law.

Assuming, then, that life appeared in the course of evolution, how did the inorganic become the organic? What is the point of passage where mud becomes alive, and what is the cause of the change?

It is easy enough to account for life if we once have a germ or cell. All life is propagated by germs, or cells, from other living things—by seed grafts or other parts of an organism. Growth is simply the adding of cell to cell, one of which starts others; and the clustering of these make our largest bodies. Though the process is not wholly understood, the fact is so common as to be no longer a mystery. But the problem is to get the germ or first cell. How did that originate? and how do such cells originate now? In other words, how does nature construct a cell? or, how does inorganic matter—mud or water—form itself by natural laws into a cell, and commence to grow up into plants and animals?

Here the analogy of crystallization may serve us, and the parallel experiments by which life is produced in much the same way as crystals. We have seen that by passing a magnetic current through a solution of nitrate of silver, crystals are formed which grow and multiply. Now if, instead of nitrate of silver, a combination of carbon is used, we can, according to Bastion and Hæckel, produce monera, or the simplest forms of organism, although this fact is not conceded by most scientists. At all events the production is easily conceivable, if not practicable, and many scientists believe that though we cannot thus produce cells now, they were originally produced in this way. Huxley observes that what the property of crystallization is to crystallizable matter, the vital property is to albuminoid matter (protoplasm.) The crystalline form corresponds to the organic form, and its internal structure to tissue structure. "It is not probable," he adds, "that there is any real difference in the

nature of molecular forces which compel the carbonate of lime to assume and retain the crystalline form, and those which cause the albuminoid matter to move and grow, select and form and maintain its particles in a state of increased motion." He then adds, without any explanation of this further than to say that it is the nature of nature to do thus, that "crystalline force being a property of matter, vital force is but a property of matter."

The cell, or the first beginning of life, may, however, be more minutely explained both as to its structure and cause. While it may be formed naturally after the manner of a crystal, the process of formation and the reason of its growth are observable up to a certain point.

A cell is of the same composition as inorganic matter. That is, living germs have no other chemical elements than have unorganized matter. They are simply, as a rule, carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen. These elements, moreover, are combined in no other proportion in a cell than they are, or may be, combined in inorganic matter. In the laboratory we may artificially combine them in this way, and it is easy to believe that they may be so combined spontaneously in nature. Thus we can produce artificially many so-called organic combinations of carbon, as alcohol, and formic acid, and perhaps the albuminoid combinations, or plastic bodies, which are of exactly the same substance as the cell, and indeed whole living bodies. The question then is; Having the substance or chemical compound of which cells are formed, how are the cells developed out of them? That is, how does the albuminous compound take the form and action of a cell?

We have seen that by purely physical laws water and other liquids will form into globular drops and take other geometric shapes. So may this semi-fluid albuminous matter, after the manner of crystal formation. It is then a cell to all external appearance, and only requires the formation of a nucleus or kernel to be complete, and to produce the further phenomena of growth. This we can conceive to take place, as Hæckel has observed, in a purely physical manner by the condensation of the

innermost central part as the albumen. The cell membrane may be formed on the surface in the same way either by a chemical deposit or as a physical condensation in the uppermost stratum of the mass, or as a secretion. This being done, the cell is complete as far as outward observation goes, and the further question is its multiplication, which, we have seen, may be of the same kind as that produced by ordinary growth from a seed or from a piece of organized plant or animal.

It is easy to conceive, in the numberless combinations and changes of nature in which so many substances and shapes are formed resembling cells, that there should, in the long ages of the past, have been produced the actual combination which constitutes a perfect cell, and which sets such cells to multiplying or growing, and so sets nature to organizing into plants as well as crystals.

This is all there is in the question of spontaneous generation—the formation of the cell—after which we can understand the development of the whole individual as easily as we can its development from a seed or sprig. The growth is only chemical and mechanical; and one cell grows into an oak and another into a thistle according to very minute differences in the geometric forms and motions at the beginning, as in the case of crystals. For both crystals and cells alike take different geometrical shapes, and proceed to build by the very force of natural law (physics and chemistry) as they are started. Gold and copper, for example, crystallize in a cubical form of crystal, bismuth and antimony in a hexagonal form, iodine and sulphur in a rhombic form; while organic forms, though mostly limited by curved surfaces and crooked lines, which meet at variable angles, have nevertheless certain mathematical forms which may be observed, as in the Radiolaria and other Protista, according to which this subsequent growth proceeds. Hæckel in his "*General Morphology*" (I., 375–574) claims to have established a general system of forms of both inorganic crystals and organic individuals, and the differences in growth proceed on the line of these.

This point accordingly—the formation of the cell and the chemical and mechanical forces which compel its multiplication and the subsequent growth of the organism—is the decisive battle-field of theories in science and philosophy, and deserves the concentration of scientific and philosophic thought to a greater extent than hitherto. The field is a limited one; only a few facts have to be determined, and then an infinity of results will follow. On the solution of this problem mainly will turn the intellectual fate of this century.

The next great point for determination is where the unconscious passes into the conscious, which is the fourth great world problem. Having life—organism—how do we get consciousness, or thought? How does a plant become an animal and feel? or, how is brought about a reproduction in thought of the nature outside of it? This is the greatest change known in nature, and constitutes a chasm which it is thought no explanation can leap. This, then, will be our next inquiry—the passage of the unconscious into consciousness, or of dead matter into thought, or unfeeling combinations into feeling ones.

The lowest and simplest form of thought is feeling, or mere animal sensitiveness, which we shall first consider. Animal life may be conceived to be developed either from plants or directly from cells; for the evidences of cell-formation, just mentioned, apply equally to cells of animal life and of vegetable life. If animals have been developed from plants, the question simply is, How did the plants become sensitive? The external properties of animal life (leaving out for the present self-consciousness) may easily be accounted for by natural causes. We have abundant experience of sensitive plants, where the plant contracts, expands, and otherwise moves like conscious beings. This is produced by the chemical and physical laws of attraction, absorption, and the like. A sensitive plant is to outward appearances a simple kind of animal, and the sensitiveness need only be increased to make a higher order of animal, for all of which, including any amount of sensitiveness, only the mechanical and chemical forces just named are necessary.

That animals are thus produced by plants becoming alive seems further established by the fact that the earliest animals have still nearly all the marks of vegetables about them, as if they had just emerged from the plant kingdom, or were still emerging. They look like plants (for the most part like seaweeds), and are often taken for such. The young sponge now well known to be an animal, was long thought by scientists to be a plant. Some well-known sea animals have branches and leaves like plants, the signs of animal life being barely distinguishable. Some are still attached to the soil or rock, as certain of the Zoöphites, and draw their nourishment from the earth and water without changing their place; while others, again, only occasionally change their place. These lower animals generally send out tendrils resembling the roots of plants to gather their nourishment from the water and soil.

It is only necessary, we say, in order to account for animal life, to suppose that some of these animals were once sea-weeds, and that they became sensitive, and that in time they got loose from the earth and carried their nutritive organs about with them, as some plants now do, which have not yet become animals.

For some plants, even before they become animals, get loose from the soil and become rovers. Several species of the *Algæ* and *Fungi* still live in the water without being fixed by roots, and are animated by more or less motion.

An animal is, accordingly, only a plant that has thus become loose, and wanders about from place to place carrying its roots with it, and striking them in the soil or water, wherever it may be, and using them as moving tendrils to catch a greater variety of nourishment. Some of these come at length to feed themselves through their mouths instead of root-like tendril, and at last to go after their food and other wants, instead of merely seizing on them when they come within reach. And the same power which makes a tendril seize its food makes it go after it.

Thus the same explanation will serve for plant and animal life, as far as the mere externals of motion, nutrition and the

like are concerned. It remains, however, to consider how the feeling is developed, or how these plants come to think; and this explanation is the same, whether we consider the animal as developed from a plant or from an original animal cell. For it is as easy to conceive that the cell, of which we have spoken, should develop into an animal as into a plant.

The question then is, How did consciousness—that is, feeling, or thought—originate, and what was the cause of it? The point in process of development where the unconscious becomes the conscious, is the greatest turning-point in nature, and of the first importance to science and philosophy. What made the stuff think? and what is it to think? How can the materials be so disposed as to make what we call a thought or feeling? This is the chasm that investigation is now asked to bridge.

It is observable that the first or most elemental thought is the representation of geometrical lines and figures, and of the motions between these, constituting appearances of surfaces and colors. And these forms and movements, we have seen, were the chief attributes of the cells which, when aggregated, make the organism. It seems as if these parts, interpenetrating, were mutually present to one another—that is, representing or conscious, which is all that thought is in its simplest condition. For the chief characteristic of organization, as we have seen, is the thorough inter-penetration and inter-movement of the particles, penetrating and moving, however, in geometric lines.

It is further observable that, having the geometrical lines and vibrations,—that is, space and motion—we can develop all else that is in our consciousness, as Hegel, Trendelenberg and several others have attempted to do so. Our thought is as simple as the cell when reduced to its ultimate elements.

Of course we may facilitate the explanation of how the unconscious became conscious by assuming that matter, or whatever the components of animate beings are, has, among its other properties, a tendency to form into or manifest itself in thought or feeling under certain conditions. But this is simply evading an explanation. The problem of science is, What is the dif-

ference between unthinking stuff and thought? and what makes the latter come out of the former? We do not know enough of matter to say it does not think, or of mind to say that it is not matter. We cannot say that the unthinking is wholly unconscious, or that there need be any explanation of the origin of thought, since it may have always existed. But to one looking from the outside at the process of development, in which thought comes only at the end of a process, the inquiry will ever arise, What causes the thought? What is the point of passage from the unconscious to the conscious? and, Is it developed by natural law from the pre-existing materials of the world? Here is the field where the battle of speculative philosophy will be fought in the near future. Psychology, in its physical relations, or the point where thought touches organic action, is now demanding special attention, and promises the most wide-reaching results.

The next great beginning or starting point which we shall consider, and which furnishes the fifth world problem, is the passage from species to species, or the beginning of new life-forms. The question of the origin of species is supposed to involve that of the whole principle of evolution. It was the claim of such origin from lower forms that led to the inference of development along the whole line of cosmical and biological history. If one species can originate from another the principle is established by which not only man has descended from the brute, but all life from non-living matter. The question, then, of the origin of species is one of the turning-points of science; and, as Darwin's book made an epoch, the settling of the question therein involved will turn the whole front of investigation.

The question then is, Does one species originate from another, or all the species fixed? If they are fixed now, have they always been the same? Has a dog always been a dog, or has he come through a wolf from a fox and lower animals? If one animal changes into another after many generations, what is the cause and the law of the change, and may it be effected artifi-

cially or by domestication? These questions have been so widely discussed of late, and the effects of cross-breeding and natural selection have been so fully presented that I will not attempt to summarize the situation, especially since it involves so many individual facts. Scientists are still divided on the subject and still working, and on no topic may we expect more fruitful results to science. In the interest of general intelligence, the world can afford to encourage a candid investigation of the subject, since it covers one of the most fruitful domains of science.

It is admitted that the species, both animal and vegetable, closely approach one another, so that placing them in the order of their supposed development, as they are in the Berlin zoological cabinet, they form almost unbroken lines of ascending series from a few simple forms. From the mole to the hog and the white bear, for example, there is an apparent regular gradation, with only a few links wanting. So with the fish, through the seal, to the deer. It is also admitted that, if we supply the lost species which are known, through their still-existing fossils, to have once existed, many of the wanting links are supplied.

On the other hand, it is generally admitted that the present species persist in their distinct forms with great tenacity. They do not, as a rule, cross; and it is difficult to produce any great varieties. Dogs cannot be turned into wolves by any known process of breeding; nor can any other well-recognized species be changed into a different well-recognized species, as a horse, for example, into a zebra, or a chicken into a duck.

Great changes may, nevertheless, be effected in the same species: a red rose may be changed into a white one. The process is simple, and is often adopted by gardeners to get a desired color or form of a particular flower. Among the common red roses, for example, those are taken which are most "off color"—that is, which have the lightest shade. The seeds of these alone are planted, and the next crop is lighter than the first. From these the lightest are taken, and the product is lighter still; and so, after a dozen generations, a light pink, and

then a pure white is obtained. So pigeons, cattle and other animals may be bred with reference to any peculiarity, until, after a number of generations, a variety is produced so unlike the original stock that it will not cross with it. So, too, conversely, from very different varieties which will not cross, changes may be made through this artificial selection, that will so resemble the desired breed as to cross with it.

The question, accordingly, is one of the extent of these variations. Can we show changes enough within our experience to warrant the inference that greater changes have occurred in the long past? Are there any real changes from species to species? and are there really any fixed species? If we can produce or can find in nature any such changes at all, we can easily infer greater changes in the past; but if we cannot find any such changes in the whole wide world, with over six thousand known years of history, the presumption is strong against its occurrence at other times. The settlement of the fact of such changes is one of the great problems of to-day; and of no less importance is the question of how the changes began. That is, What changes do we know to have occurred? and what causes can we discover for them? What changes can we produce, and with what uniformity? Can the fact and the law of the transmutation of species be established? On the occurrence of changes before our eyes depends our ability to make inferences about occurrences in the past and other kinds of occurrences than those which we see. Do we, therefore, witness a development going on about us from which to infer the missing link in the doctrine of evolution? The nebular hypothesis, and even the whole process of evolution, depends largely on the changes which we know to occur; so that the observations made of change in species are all important to science.

The next great question, which constitutes one of the perpetual problems of the race, is the freedom of the will, or origin of designed action. According as one decides this question the whole philosophy of life is affected to him: It involves the existence of God, the fact of creation, the responsibility of man,

the basis of morals and the whole reign of law. If the will is free we can easily infer beginnings of actions in the Deity, and we can infer special creations as well as a general creation—that is, creations in the formation of species and individuals, as well as in all kinds of providences. The Deity would, in such creations, be conceded to be doing nothing but what man is doing—making new beginnings or creations. It implies a break in the natural laws and order of things, and the great beginnings of which we have spoken become easy of conception or inference; for beginnings are, on the supposition of the freedom of the will, a matter of daily experience, and the continuance of things as the equivalents of the preceding becomes a disproved hypothesis; for the question of the freedom of the will involves that of the universality and uniformity of law. If the will comes in to interrupt the course of events, or make an absolutely new beginning, then it follows that law is not exceptionless. There is something above it and outside of it; and whether this is so is the question. Is there something lawless in the world? or something which depends on an intelligence that is exempt from natural law and operating in another realm? And must we, accordingly, assume that there are two systems of nature, or a law of mind and volition that is not subject to the law of matter or process of evolution?

The problem, accordingly, is, Is there any absolute beginning of action out of nothing, or out of nothing which necessitates it? Is will a cause or an effect, the beginning or end of a process? Does it go before or come after force? Is it a link in the chain or the beginning of the chain? Is it, in short, like intelligence, the producer or produced? The question will always be, Which is first, design or force? the mental or the unconscious cause?

There is, perhaps, a reconciliation of the freedom of the will with the hypothesis of development in that, according to this hypothesis, as we have seen, there are many beginnings which seem to have nothing like them as a cause, as the beginning of crystallization, the beginning of cells, the beginning of intelli-

gence. The question may suggest itself, Is will a starting-point like spontaneous crystallization and spontaneous generation—a starting of action as the other is a starting of organization? The question, then, would be, When and how, according to the development theory, does intelligence start into effort? When does feeling and intelligence become intention? and when and how does intention become action? It is the starting to do that puzzles philosophy.

According to this theory volition is not an absolute beginning, but a new form of manifestation proceeding out of the preceding forces; and in all theories of the freedom of the will the willing comes from a previously existing being. The intelligence of that being is the cause of the action. The question simply remains, Can intelligence cause action, or start force? And is this intelligence itself produced by unthinking force; or, is nature at the last resort started by intelligence? This is the problem of the freedom of the will, and either is contained in that of evolution, or embraces it.

The place of will in nature, as that of intelligence, is the greatest problem of locating that thought has been called on to solve; as it implies the location not only of man, but of God. The battle between religion and science will, like that of social life, be mainly one of precedence—of the precedence of intention or of force, as it is of the precedence of intelligence or matter. Did design produce nature, or was it produced by it? Is it the head or tail of a process? In evolution is it the starting or ending point? Are we descended from or mounting to intelligence? The whole problem is, What is the beginning of the beginnings we have been speaking about? Do things begin in light or darkness, in thought or unconsciousness, in the living or the dead?

We are constantly starting, and yet have never located the start. We are constantly willing, and yet have not settled what it is that wills. We know not what takes place in us when we begin a movement. We cannot go behind our consciousness and learn what produces that. The greatest prob-

lem of philosophy is, What is the father of our thoughts and deeds? Are we the stream through which influences pass, or the fountain whence they spring? Is creation to be found in our action, or only a small natural effect? Have the beginnings another beginning, or is volition a coming out of nothingness? Does the mind originate anything that was not originated by what produced the mind?

If there is no origination in willing, the problem still remains of the strange passage from the unconscious force to the conscious effort, a passage as strange as that from the unconscious matter to consciousness in general; and the question is, How did the force which determines our act pass into conscious intention and effort? This is one of the great beginnings—the beginning of effort, or the starting up of things in response to purpose.

It is no solution of the problem to assert the necessity of our acts—to say that it is a property of matter or of the materials of us—to start, under certain conditions, into action, *i. e.*, to assert the production of intention and volition by natural forces, and according to natural law. The question would then remain, How do the natural forces come into such a new form as intention or will? The passage from the passive to the active, or from an albuminous compound into effort is still the question to be solved. What produces the singular phenomena of will from any other state whatever?

The seventh and last great beginning, or starting point in science and philosophy, is the starting up from death, or passage from the present life to a future one. This is the question of the resurrection, or seventh great world-problem. On its solution hang the greatest hopes of man; so that its importance and its difficulty together make it a perpetual problem.

Having so many starting points in the course of evolution, where inexplicable beginnings occur, and where they seem to have no adequate cause in what precedes, we naturally think it possible that there may be one here. Those who admit the

fact of a future life are confronted with the problem of the passage; those who do not, raise the question of whether there is a new beginning. For many reasons the question is upon us, and will always provoke attempts at solution.

There is a lavish tendency in nature to produce life. According to the development hypothesis the earth is everywhere breaking out into beginnings of life, or did so at least in the past. There is hardly a cubic inch of earth or water that has not something living in it, and sometimes a million creatures exist in as small a space. The air is equally full of them. Out of the dead especially do they spring. Decaying flesh and vegetation and stagnant water and air swarm with living forms. Nearly every solution breeds them. The whole earth is an incubator as well as a grave. Whether the germs are in it, or life is spontaneously generated, the fact is, that the powers of life-production are thick in it, and the surface of the earth is practically alive. Nearly everything in its course of changes occasionally gets alive, or enters into something living. There is a general tendency to get out of death. The inanimate is not a fixed state. Bits of earth become alive, and clods and water-drops get up and move. A cheese if left alone will, in time, nearly all get up and run away. The purest vinegar will soon turn into a menagerie. There is as much living among the dead as among the recognized life. The dead has not yet found a fixed realm or acknowledged place in the world; it is not left alone. The grave is awakened by animation. The power of nature to produce life is as great as its power to produce death. Not only by generation, but by subdivision of the living parts, is life propagated. The living seems full of seed, and germs are countless for which no parent is known. The history of the world is little more than a march of the dead toward life. According to the development hypothesis the world has simply marched on to reproduce itself in thought.

In this great liberality of nature for life, in which every kind of living thing is reproduced and made productive of other and higher forms, is there a reproduction of thought through itself?

The body, we have seen, breeds worms, and springs up into grass and re-combines in various living things. Does the soul leave any relics that take on life, or enter into forms of life of its own kind? Has thought a seed? Are there germs of consciousness? Will it, if separated, like the egg or cell, live, and start a body about it? Will it live separate from the parent stem, like a piece of tape-worm or graft from a vine? Consciousness, which we cannot see come and cannot see go, is such a great factor in the world, that we cannot say that it is all ended with its disappearance from our eyes. There may be conscious as well as unconscious germs, thought-propagation, as well as body-propagation. Souls may fill the air as well as flies. Especially is this so if the mind is something that got into the body, and not a part or product of it,—which is still a matter of speculation among thinkers.

We say, therefore, in view of the many beginnings we have, and of the general tendency of the world to turn into life, and of the many ways of propagating existing life, and of the march of life in reproduction into higher forms, it will always be a question whether there is a passage-way across death, and a beginning of another existence for the consciousness (or some of it) that leaves this life. Consciousness is the greatest fact we have. In one sense it includes all others, since we know of nothing that is not in the mind. The world itself, as known to us, is only thought. To say that this thought will be annihilated, and that the world—its content—will remain, is an improbable thing to philosophy or pure reason. Nobody has yet followed himself when he is dead to see what becomes of him; and so we have no knowledge of death after death, any more than of life after death. Where the thoughts go has never been determined; and to say that they leave no relics, or seed, or anything like themselves anywhere is a gratuitous assumption. It will, accordingly, ever remain a question whether there is a new beginning beyond the career of evolution as known in this world, in which the soul will go on; and, if so, what is the character of that beginning and of the life following it. Does

evolution, which reaches thought, stop here, or is there a new beginning? Is there an evolution in thought, and does thought propagate itself in after lives, as bacteria and fleas do when they are once brought into existence in this life? Must we say that evolution stops where we now find it, or at the point where we have farthest pursued it? What are the capacities of consciousness for continued and independent existence?

Such, therefore, are the seven great beginnings in science, or starting-points of new forms of existence, which constitute the perpetual problems of philosophy, and may be called the seven intellectual wonders of the world. They are problems of whether and how things originate; where old processes end and new ones begin, in which the new is so unlike the old as to find no explanation in it; where law seems to stop and an impassable chasm to separate the new from the old. The bridging of the chasm is the problem, or the question of whether nature has power to make absolute beginnings. It is a question, in each case, of a beginning—of the beginning of existence, of the beginning of law, of the beginning of organization, of the beginning of life, of the beginning of thought, of the beginning of species, of the beginning of volition, and of the beginning of future life. The chief problems of philosophy all centre on change—the point where nature takes turns and new kinds of existence begin. It is the point where epochs commence in evolution, where nature seems to have births, instead of mere growths or continuances, and where there is a stop like death and then new forms from out the grave or womb which nothing can explain.

For nature itself appears to have seed and to reproduce itself. New offspring are born to it and a commencement of development again begins. Nature begets new forms of itself, as well as reproductions of the old; and the birth-days and birth-marks of these forms are now the great problems of science. What is the cause of nature's taking several forms? or of its entering upon distinct processes? And how does it give birth to

itself in forms so different from its former self as to seem something else entirely—as mind from matter, for example? The resurrections of nature are the problems, where a new life or force comes into being, as if from the dead, and contrasts with the old as life does with death. On these problems we expect science to fix its attention, and we await its results with much concern.

V.

EXTRACTS FROM GIOBERTI.

BY REV. CHARLES C. STARBUCK.

IV.

SYMPATHY is founded on the pre-established harmony of the individuals, and hence on the unity of the race. Thereby the individual feels himself in the race, and feels the race in himself; and hence arises this species of personal communication with other individuals. Sympathy is marvellously expressed by that Terentian verse :

"Homo sum et nihil humani a me alienum puto."

This verse expresses also the duty which results from it. But the Gospel deduced from sympathy the love of our neighbor and the first of human duties. Charity—Christian love—is therefore founded on the concrete unity of the race in the individual. The predominance of the race in the individual is the proper character of the woman; the predominance of the individual in the race, of the man. Hence the feminine genius is potency; the masculine is act. Sympathy, therefore, is especially the property of the woman. This is why Christianity has the character of femininity; inasmuch as its scope, to revive sympathy, and to exalt it to the grade of duty with the principle of charity, necessarily gave the predominance to the sense of the race over that of the individual. So much the more as sympathy and the predominance of the race over the individual is the characteristic of civilization, and the contrary of barbarism. Because in civilization the nation prevails over the indi-

vidual; in barbarism the reverse is true. The temper of civilization, therefore, is feminine; that of barbarism, masculine. It is true, the perfect civilization has need of the two things; but when Christ rose the principle of individualism was in excess. Sacrifice is sympathy and charity brought to their consummation. It is the immolation of the individual to the race. This is why sacrifice is especially congenial to the genius of woman and of Christianity.

Death is the exit from the discrete and the entrance into the continuum. It is, therefore, the beginning of a superior existence, of the immanent life.

The world is the Megacosmos. The consciousness is the Microcosmos. The Megacosmos is a complex of blind sensibles moved by instinct; intelligence is there in the state of fœtus and unconscious of itself. Little by little as the force becomes scient and individuates itself distinctly, it becomes man, that is, consciousness. Consciousness is a camera obscura in which there reflect themselves the Word and the Megacosmos. Providence is an intuitive truth, since it consists in the Logos, governor of the Cosmos. The antischemas which are found in the creation do not annul liberty, since they argue only the contingency and the liberty of the creature. Consciousness is microcosm in one respect, inasmuch as man is contained corporeally in the world, it is megacosm, inasmuch as the world is contained ideally in the spirit.

What thing is man? He is a god, who commences and who possesses only a part of eternity.

Niebuhr remarks that military strategy reduces itself to two systems; that is, that in which the mass, and that in which the individual prevails; the Macedonian phalanx and the Roman legion. This distinction can be applied to all the cosmic forces, and above all to political states.

Motion being the endeavor of the finite toward the infinite, of the mimesi toward the metessi, and of the duality of the discrete chronotope toward the unity of the continuum, the individual of grand genius in whom there actuates itself more

largely the generic mimesis of the cosmos, is extraordinarily fond of motion and celerity, as well in the field of external action as in that of thought. From this grows the magic of conquests for supreme intellects and their celerity in motion and in action, as well as their fondness for riding and sailing. Celerity is born of facility. Now facility (synonymous with faculty as Vico notes) is the easy capacity of the potency to actuate itself without effort. The infinite facility is the creative action of God. Finite facility is the dowry of the supreme genius; whence it pleases us to see it also in the works of art, in the word, in the gesture, etc., where effort offends us. Facility is not opposed to careful art, although it produces naturalness. What is there at once more facile and more carefully planned than nature?

Not only does biography, for beauty, importance, utility, depth, precision, surpass history, but the latter has no value except so far as biography prevails in it, and as there is in it one supreme, or else a few grand individuals, around whom events group themselves. History without marked individuals is wearisome and unprofitable. The reason is, that it is the account of the race and of the human potency, without individuated act. Hence it is confused, shapeless, indeterminate; it has no precise contours and lineaments. Whence it is that the only beautiful historical epochs are those in which grand individuals appear on the field; superlatively beautiful those few in which many grand individuals form an escort around a grandest. Whence there is no history comparable to that of the Roman empire in the century just before our era. The notion is, that in barbarous peoples the individual prevails. The contrary is true. The signature of barbarism is, on the contrary, the absolute prevalence of the race. Nor can it be otherwise, for barbarism is the potency, and civilization is the act. Whence, when among barbarous peoples one or several grand individuals arise, such as Arminius, Mohammed, Manco Capac, Quezalcoatl, there is a dawn of civilization, fugitive or enduring. The multitudes are historical and dramatical only when they act as

one sole man, as the Bible says, that is, where they are individuated.

It is a singular thing, and strange at first sight, that the Germanic stock, which brought into the southern world barbarism, and with it civil aristocracy, should now be for this same Mediterranean world, the principal fountain of science. I say that this is remarkable because conquest in the field of politics and of arms, and the works of genius, proceed from the force and exuberance of the genius. This, while rude, loves to display its vigor in the use of the muscles, and in the circle of mimetic sports; but as these advance, the nascent culture of the conquering race opens the way to the victories and metessic conquests of the intellect. Whence every military and heroic age is followed by a civil age. True, it is required to this end, if the vanquished are cultivated, that the vanquisher should take from them the germs of the refinement which is lacking in him, as did the Germans, who civilized themselves and came to be what they are by marrying their genius to the pelagic word.

Of metaphysical medicine. The mind is the principle of generation, of life, of hygiene, of cure, of health. Influence of the soul on the body is much neglected by modern physicians. The ancients made more account of it. This forgetfulness of the soul comes from the modern division of science. The influence of the soul upon the body is exercised by the reason, by the sensibility, and by the will. The reason by means of science, the sensibility by means of tranquillity, and the will by activity and by constancy are the cause of health. Gymnastics and music stand midway between philosophy and medicine. Kinsmanship of medicine with religion and with morals. The use, the vivacity, the celerity of the mind assist the health, do not hurt it, as is believed. *L'homme qui réfléchit est un animal défrayé.* (ROUSSEAU). Thoroughly false. The vigor of the soul increases that of the body. Example of Julius Cæsar and of the ancients in general. It is not study, but the mode of modern study that ruins the body. Thus, too, excessive asceticism and contemplation. Necessary elements of study, air and light.

Air and light assist the faculties of the intellect and the body jointly. To study under open heavens, among trees, by the side of running waters, or, at least, in rooms well aired. Our scholars are more delicate than women.

The primitive and Japhetic heroes do not think, but only act. They traverse space, fight and conquer; their dialectic exercises itself against inanimate nature, the wild beasts, their savage countrymen, and certain monsters or black tyrants, in whom is to be viewed shadowed forth the decaying and ferocious domination of the Hamites. Their life moves midway between the antediluvian and preadamitic world of the fossils, in which the beasts all or in part lorded it over the earth, and the human world; between the Hamitic lordship and that of the Japhetites; between the barbarism of the hunting life, woodland and wandering, and the culture growing out of the pastoral life, normal but tented, and out of agriculture, housed and stationary. Such are Theseus, Hercules, Perseus, Bellerophon. The pelagic hero is the first manifestation of the grand individual who breaks forth out of the castal virtuality. The castes are already an adumbration of social individuality; in them the individual is not a man, but a class. They represent to us the evolution of many distinct species from the unity of the anterior race. In India the heroes, like Rama, are already thinkers, and unite meditation with active life. But this shows a subsequent fiction of the priests, being the sacerdotal poems.

Dante considers instinct as belonging not only to animals, but to all creatures, no one excepted, and considers the instinct as the motion or the faculty which bears all existences through the great sea of being toward their port. (Par. I.) Now what is this instinct? It is identical with that *desire* which moves the heavens and bears them toward the final cause. Such a doctrine is wholly Peripatetic, and shows that Aristotle and Dante conceived, although confusedly, that the essence of things is mentality; since *instinct* and *desire* are two mental grades; grades, however, imperfect and similar to the confused perceptions of the Leibnitzian monad. This doctrine is not meta-

phorical and poetical in Dante, because it agrees with that of Aristotle. A poet may say metaphorically that instinct carries heavy bodies to the centre, that water desires to reunite itself to the sea, etc. But in a Peripatetic poet these phrases have a scientific value, because they are intimately connected with Aristotle's doctrine concerning the final cause.

Men talk of the relations of the physical with the moral in man. But the relations are made to reside in a simple extrinsic and abstract bond of the soul with the body. Now the truth is that the soul and the body are two abstractions, and that the true concrete is their relation. Such relation is the man; the man is not soul nor body, but the relation of the one with the other. The man is the undivided point, in which the physical and the moral neutralize each other. The systems as to the commerce of the soul with the body are founded on a false idea, which is that man as substance is a duality and not a unity. Now man is first of all a unity; the duality does not come till afterwards. Such unity is concrete, substantially, because it is the human person, the man. The relation then is more real than its terms. Instead, then, of seeking how the soul is in connection with the body, that is, how the duality unifies itself, we ought to seek how the unity of the man dualizes itself in its two substances.

The psyche, or cosmic soul of the ancients, is the universal metessi. The world, every force, being intelligible, is soul; and hence it has intellect, will, choice, imagination, memory, sensibility, and all the powers of the human soul. But it has them approximately, that is, analogically, as intelligence is in instinct and the waking state in sleep; as thought is in the perception of the Leibnitzian monad. The waking state is the exteriority and the objectivity of the imagination; the dream is its interiority and subjectivity. The waking state and the dream are the two sides of the imagination; the imagination is the mimesis of the intellect, as the sensible of the intelligible. Hence Heraclitus says that the waking have a common world: the sleeping each one a world of his own. Nature is the waking

state of the cosmic soul. Its forces are its interiority. Order is reason; contingency, choice; periodicity, memory; the moving force, will, attraction, affinity, love, etc.

The two poles of the created mentality are the intellect and the activity (free will). The neutral state of these is the pure mentality, that is, the psychic force in its first dynamic moment, in the entelechnic state, or state of indifference. The intellect and the activity are, with respect to the pure mentality as the particular and secondary unity respecting the general and primitive unity. But compared with each other, the intellect expresses the generality, and the activity expresses the individuality. The dialectic is the polar action, that is, the alternation of the neutral and indifferent state. In this alternation resides the universal life. The intellect becomes activity; the activity, intellect, with continual alternation, in which consists the life of the soul. The intellect and the activity are the two metessic poles, and hence the two metessic faculties of the soul; inasmuch as every faculty is nothing else than a pole, that is, an opposite form of identity and returning to identity in the cyclic motion. Sensitive perception and sensitive feeling (*sensibilità* and *affette*) are the two mimetic faculties, poles: they are in the order of mimesi that which the intellect and activity are in the order of the metessi. The intellect and the activity are the palingenesiac faculties; the sensitive perception and feeling the telluric faculties. But the intellect and the activity are opposed, distinct, polar only in the terrestrial state, in virtue of their complication with the mimetic powers. In the metessic state they will lose their polarity, and will be reunited in pure mentality. Polarity is proper to the mimesi and to the telluric state. It cannot have place in the metessi and in the palingenesiac state, because it presupposes contrast and conflict. Hence two created harmonies: (1) the imperfect, initial harmony, which is born of conflict, a harmony confined to our terrestrial world. Its law is polarity; (2) the complementary perfect harmony which excludes battle, and hence polarism. In it the multifold is reunited in one unique form. The complementary harmony is the

return of polarism to the primitive neutrality; but this neutrality is now perfected, that is, reunited into the perfect explication of the created force. Hence three states in the created force, whose succession constitutes the cyclic motion: first state, initial: primitive neutrality and indifference, duality and polarity only potential; second state, midmost: duality and polarity actual, conflict; third state, final and complementary: perfect unity, neutrality and indifference with exclusion of the potential unity.

Petrarch calls his own soul his *consort*. Dante also says (and Tasso) that the soul espouses itself to the body. The union, in fact, between the soul and the body is a true marriage, which corresponds to that of the metessi and of the mimesi, of the intelligible and of the sensible, of the idea and of the image, of the genius and of the word. The body is the sign of the soul. The man, therefore, as endowed with spirit and with body, is masculino-female.

The animation of nature and the personification of her various parts, shown in the Græco-Latin polytheism and in the poets, are an obscure anticipation of the palingenesiac metessi. The imagination is the author of this prophetic fable. Now the imagination is a mimetic reason which exalts itself upon the sensitive perception and is prelusive to the true reason. By way of it the reason exalts itself above the undeveloped, rudimental, mimetic life of the present order, and becomes prelusive to that birth of nature to which all beings aspire, as says the Apostle. The palingenesiac metessi will be the conversion of sensible into intelligible, of the sentient into intelligent, and hence the impersonation of nature. This will be the new heaven and the new earth.

The reason creates the imagination, as being creates existence. Imagination is made in the image of reason, as man in the image of God.

Instinct is grace in the order of the body.

In the dream the man is spectator of himself, as if placed outside of himself in a place diverse from that in which he finds

himself, and operating and living in a false world. The dream is therefore the objectified imagination. By it the ego parts itself into two and becomes spectator of itself as an extrinsic thing. The dream is the normal type of the hallucination. This is the dream of the waking state, as the dream is the hallucination of sleep. Obsession is the culmination of hallucination. Because in the latter the duplication which the ego makes of itself is imperfect; in the former, perfect.

According to Aristotle, nature consists fontally in desire, in respect to which God is the good sought—the final cause. It is therefore mentality, and hence metessi. Nature not only loves, but is love—friendship. The Empodeclean principle is not a simple metaphor. Love is dialecticism. Nature, being mentality and love, is therefore a living dialecticism. Every reality, every existence is a relation and a dialecticism, because it is a thought and a love. Such is the essence of every force.

Optimism is false in so far as it presupposes that the world is finite on every side, and that God has been necessitated to create it. It is true, in so far as it recognizes it as best, because optimism is the only thing that can explain the origin of evil. Two errors with regard to the world. Some make it finite in every direction, and are the common-place philosophers; the others make it infinite actually and are the pantheists. The truth is that the world is finite in act and infinite in potency. It is finite in act because the actual numerical infinite is self-contradictory. It is infinite in potency, because it always goes on amplifying itself in time and in space, and creation, being continuous, will never have an end. The amplification in space is attested to us by the genesis of the nebulae. The world [*mondo*, not as meaning a planet, but *universe*—C. C. S.] is a god which commences, which lives successively, and will never have end. Because there are not and cannot be more worlds [*i. e.*, universes], because every possible will go on actuating itself in the infinite course of existences. Yet the world is contingent, because it had a beginning, and does not actuate itself except successively. The creative act was free, because it would

have been able to create nothing, to create for a time, and in infinite other modes. That which attests to us the creation as sempiternal is the existence of evil. The existence of evil is required (1) by the nature of the contingent infinite; (2) by moral heroism. The world is not then the best combination possible, as Leibnitz will have it, but the successive complex of all the complications possible. The optimism of the world is never in act, but only in potency, because the world is always in continuous and-infinite progress. The infinite and potential world is best; the finite and actuated worlds are only *good*, as is said in Genesis. The system of the successive numerical infinite is the only one that can remove the inconveniences of the finite world and of the simultaneous infinite. The universe, with all its parts, exists in two modes: as sensible and mimetic, as supra-sensible and metessic. We have an example of it in the angelic world which preceded us. The metessi is the passage from *motion to state*, from *succession to immanence*. But the state and the immanence of the metessi is not like that of God: it is limited, is finite, because it had a beginning. When it is said that the metessi is posterior to the mimesi, the word *posterior* implies time in only one of the two terms, because the metessi is immanent, and hence does not come before or after.

Leopardi contradicts himself. He says in one place that all is vain, and that finding and discovering only nothingness increases. In another place that man is nothing, because the earth is less than the least grain of sand in the universe. Now these two assertions are mutually contradictory. The second places the importance of existence in extension and in material greatness; the first denies this. Because, if man is an atom because his body is an atom, it follows that the mass of the universe is something of great moment. If the mass is of no account, and its increments are nothing, man can have and maintain his grade even in immensity. And have it how? In thinking. And Leopardi confesses this in a third place. Now this other sentence conciliates the first two. Yes, extension is a nothing as extension; that is, as sensible and mimetic; but it is

something great as fulness of the idea, expression of the metessi, involution of thought. Man is an atom of an atom as to the site which he occupies ; but the corporeal universe itself is an atom with respect to man as endowed with power of choice and reason.

Leopardi says that "only ennui, which is always born of the vanity of things, is never vanity, nor deceit; it is never founded on falsehood. And it may be said that, everything else being vain, whatever the life of men has of substantial and of real may be reduced to ennui." The vanity of things is the mimesi, *i. e.*, the phenomenon, the bark of beings, which passes continually and is not, as say Heraclitus and St. Paul. But the mimesi presupposes the metessi, transit immanence, the bark the medulla, the surface the depth, in fine the mode and the accident argue the substance. Leopardi, himself, elsewhere does not deny substance, since he admits one or more prime, eternal, necessary, immutable forces of matter, although, he says, they are unknown to us. The substantiality of things is then as certain to us as their outward guise; indeed, almost more certain, for if it is denied we must needs fall into absolute skepticism. Now vanity regards the phenomenon, not that which underlies it. True it is that we cannot know and possess at present the substantiality of beings, and hence is born ennui, which is nothing else than the effect of need conjoined with the lack of such substantiality. That our actual conditions are incompatible with such possession is clear on many sides; and it suffices to see that we are in time, and possession implies immanence. But ought we to conclude that such possession is to fail us in a future state? Leopardi concludes so, and this is the disconsolate conclusion of his philosophy. But such conclusion is inconsistent with the primary law of the universe, which is the transformation of beings; which argues the conservation of their substance. The substance of our mind, therefore, cannot perish. Nor let the fact of death be alleged; because death is a pure phenomenon, which does not touch the substance of things, but only the surface; and Leopardi, by saying the contrary, contradicts his own affirmations.

Synthesis of austere joy with pain in moral sacrifice. It indicates the transit from virtue to beatitude,—is the passage from the sensible to the intelligible. Faith stands ready to become love and delight.

The symbolism of the animals is common to all the cultivated ancients and founded in nature. The animal, being an individual without *reason* and *freedom* of its own, and hence without *personality*, expresses a general idea; not so man as free. The dog differs from the dog only accidentally; all dogs are like each other and express only one idea: the idea *dog*. Not so man, who, being free, is capable of contraries and of excesses. Now as the symbol ranges in a general idea, the brute is most apt for this. The animal, moreover, is governed by instinct. Now instinct is nothing else than *the liberty and the reason of God* operating in a sensitive nature; as the blind forces are the liberty and the reason of God operating in vegetable and inorganic nature. Now as emanation identifies nature with God, the brute appears to it as a divine manifestation more immediate than man himself, in whom the power of choice introduces a species of dualism and conflict between the phenomenon and the real substance. This duality and this conflict are not seen in the brute, whence the theocosmic action alone manifests itself. Hence the zoölatry of peoples otherwise the most cultivated.

The free acts are transitory as reflective and externalized: immanent as intuitive and external. This is founded in the extra-temporal nature of intuition and of free activity. The final, extra-temporal, supernatural apparition of the free acts in their immanence is the *final judgment*. The evil free act is annulled by the Divine omnipotence, through the infinite merit of Christ. Otherwise it endures always. The immanence of the act explains the eternity of the pain. Sublime spectacle of the judgment. Every least human act, save those which were cancelled of God, will appear as present. The long series of time will appear concentrated in one sole point, that is, in the eternal. Nero will be slaying his mother, Judas betraying

Christ, Paulinus of Nola be selling himself as a slave [as the first Moravian missionaries to the West Indies stood ready to do], etc. What a sublime spectacle! What terror and what shame on one hand; what joy and what glory on the other!

Good is the last development, the complement, the quiet of the dynamic motion of the human mind. It is the indeation, the apotheosis of the mind; the finally accomplished likeness of God; the complement of the second creative cycle.

Sacrifice is the immolation of the affection, that is, of the subject, to the law; that is, to the object, by means of the free will. The sacrificer is at the same time victim. The sacrifice produces merit. Merit is extensible also to other men.

The *intellectual* is the synthesis of the *intelligible* and of the *intelligent*. It is synonymous with *mental*, expresses pure mentality.

The animals have a necessary, fated, instinctive morality. Instinct takes the place with them of free will and reason. Now the instinct being fatedly moved of God, the morality which it expresses is divine; and more divine in this respect than that of man. This explains the origin of the fable, or apologue. The apologue, born in the East, presupposes that the brute is a model, a divine example for men. And truly the brute may rather serve as an example to man than man to the brute; since the action of the brute, as fated, is divine; that of man, as free, is human. From the fable to zoölatry is but a step. To whoever considers the action of the brute as divine, its morality as an example, it is easy to pass over to the divinizing of the brute. And the step is inevitable for the pantheist, who, although he divinizes all, must consider the brute as an expression of God more perfect than man. This is why the Hamites, authors of the most ancient civilization, were zoölaters. The earth was belluine before being adamitic. The fauna that first inhabited the earth was in a certain manner instructress of the human race, and so behaved it to be. The savage is a disciple of the brutes that surround him. A trace and abuse of this is seen in the Edenic history of the serpent:

the protoparents were ill-educated by the heir of the pre-adamitic saurians. And does not the condemnation of the serpent to *creep* point to the conversion of the saurian into an ophidian? A right use of this belluine pedagogy is discovered when the animals pass before Adam, and he gives them names. This was an exordium of zoölogy. Adam was the Solomon, the Theophrastus, the Aristotle, the Linnæus, of nascent science. He was master and disciple of the brutes, sovereign and subject at once. This was a school of mutual instruction; the first dawn of the Lancastrian method.

Liberty is identical with the reason; because this is the knowledge and that the choice of the contingent with the guidance of the necessary. It passes through two grades—perfect and imperfect, mundane and ultramundane. It is the faculty by which the soul increases and divinizes itself successively, drawing near to the fulness and to the universality of the metessi, uniting itself to God, appropriating to itself the universe and the idea. Such augmentation operates in two ways: with science and with morality, but especially with this last. Because scientific increments and acquisitions have need of the memory, whereas virtue is independent of it. Merit endures, even if it forgets itself. The fact is undeniable.

The ancients used to say that the virtues were three: natural, moral, logical. This indicates their parallelism. To these correspond world, virtue, science. To these add art. The natural virtue is the work of God, because the world is a divine production. It ought then to be the type of the other three virtues, which are human. Now the natural virtue, the order of the world, consists in the unification, in the deification of the existent, the medium being the passage of the mimesi to the metessi, and the course of the finite toward the infinite. Such, then, is the law of morality, of logic, of art. Morality tends to the unification of men among themselves and with God.

Pleasure makes part of the sensible, of the mimesi. There are spiritual pleasures (intellectual, æsthetic, scientific, moral) and corporeal pleasures. Pleasure in general is pure and legit-

imate where the mimesi accords with the metessi and with the idea; that is as much as to say where it is dialectic and harmonizes with itself. Whence pure pleasure is disjoined from pain. Pleasure, on the contrary, is defective when it disagrees with the metessi and with the idea. Guilty pleasure, therefore, is always sophistical, antidialectical, and accordingly always mixed with pain. Pleasure was vitiated by original sin, which was the original sophistic of human nature. This is why all actual pleasures, even the most legitimate and the most vivid, are intermixed, as Manzoni notes, with a little pain. Pain is the effort which the mimesi makes to recover the primitive dialectic. It presupposes, therefore, the sophistic; but is a fight against this sophistic. It is then dialectical and harmonized by such a character. This is why pain is moral, or at least tends to be so; and in the actual state is a means of expiation and of salvation. Expiation is pain sustained to re-attain the primitive dialectic. Salvation consists in such re-attainment. It is like the crisis in the sickness of the body. Religion justifies pain, because it considers it as a means of re-establishment. Pain is punishment; but every punishment is ameliorative. Ameliorative of order in general (justice), and of the culpable one (compassion). Even toward the damned, punishment is merciful, because it is credible that it may diminish their guilt. Hell is a purgatory eternal, but decreasing *ad infinitum*. Leopardi did not understand the nature of pain, and hence failed to recognize Providence, because he did not understand the present nature of pleasure. Present pleasure, being sophistical and containing an element of guilt, presupposes, of necessity, the existence of pain. Paradise, the palingenesiac blessedness, is pleasure severed from pain and recalled to its primitive purity and dialectic, rendered immanent and increasing *ad infinitum*. Hell is pain rendered perpetual and immanent, but decreasing *ad infinitum*.

Dynamic and dialectic progress of morality, divine and human. God at the beginning is only the strong and the powerful; then the first, then the good. So in the life of individuals and of peoples; right is at the beginning that of the stronger,

then that of the juster, then that of the better. So in criminal law, at first there is dominant the prepotence of the strong. The judge is a conqueror, the culprit is a conquered man; the court is a triumph, an arena. Such is the potential justice of war and of athletic and martial sports (the hunting of Nimrod the conqueror); then justice (whose rudest image is the *lex talionis*), whose most vulgar understanding is the family feud; then compassion, clemency (amelioration of the guilty, pardon to the repentant, amnesty, regeneration). A similar process has place in the penal code of the other life, in the idea of hell; thus the hell of St. Augustine, the hell of the Middle Ages, the modern hell. As much is seen in the family, in war, in the idea of monarchy, of the government, in the idea of the prince, of the magistrate, of the citizen, in all the elements and orders of human civilization. This process is that of the mimesi toward the metessi, of the initial metessi toward the final. Every moral grade is the potency of the following. Force and goodness are the two extremes of such process; justice holds the middle (chronological, dynamical, logical, not dialectical), and participates of both. Force is an implicit justice. Force, in fact, is vigor of existence, is the energy of Aristotle, the Stoic tension. Now existence is mentality, and hence, morality. This is what there is of divine in force, and hence of real. Therefore, when rude peoples justify, divinize force in God, or in themselves, they have a confused sentiment of the morality which is involved in this; which gives a certain aspect of nobleness to the use which they make of it. Hence the epic nobility of the force of Ajax, of Achilles, of Rustem, of Rama, of Ruggiero, etc. And note that such force is necessary in those times, and serves to found the first societies, to ordain the first justice; a sign that this is contained in that; otherwise it would not issue out of it. This explains to us the type of the primitive hero, and especially of Hercules. Hercules is the force of the muscles and of the mind, but used in behalf of justice; it is the endeavor, the first act of this, the egg which comes out of the mouth of the Egyptian Cnufi. Whence the

mythical Hercules produces the lyric and Stoic Hercules; Ulysses comes out of Achilles, the Odyssey out of the Iliad. In Minerva, however, goddess of arms and of sense, the two things unite. As force is the involution of justice, this is the implication of love. Justice is a potential and initial love. The penalty of justice becomes pardon in the arms of love. Religion, civilization, letters, institutions, individuals, peoples, tend to love as to the ultimate end. Love is the harmony, the complement of dialectism; the pure mentality, the final metessi, the palingenesis, heaven, paradise, the final act of all things. Love is God, and in the divine process itself the Trinity issues in the Spirit, that is, in love. But love is not only the end, it is also the beginning and the middle of all things. Hence it is the first God of Hesiod; it is the most ancient and the newest God at once. He is a child, but endowed with eternal childhood. Love is all in sum, because it is the creative act, the synthesis, the copula of the ideal formula. It is the universal copula, relation, the absolute, reality, morality, thought universally. It is the creative act and the conservative act, and the redemptive act, and the glorificative act. It punishes, rewards, pardons. It is the creation and the palingenesis and the cosmos. It creates paradise and diminishes hell. It is the principle of dialectic, of generation, of life, of progress. It founds marriage, the family, the city, the nation, the species civilization. It is attraction, affinity, instinct, sentiment, affection, thought. It takes all forms, and is the soul of all beings, the cause of all phenomena. It is the general nexus of the universe. Christianity agrees with this doctrine, by saying that God is love, by placing in love the fulfillment of the law, by assigning to love the principality upon the earth, by making of it the unique virtue of heaven, and that property by which virtue in general identifies itself with pleasure, with felicity, with beatitude.

The Celts and the Germans have a diverse temper: those subjective, like Descartes, and appropriate to themselves everything; they find themselves in other peoples; these objective

like Spinoza. The French transform and Frenchify all that which they touch; they find themselves in other peoples, give to others their own nature, are not successful in foreign languages, and resemble in this respect the ancient Greeks. The Germans, on the other hand, leave things in their being and transfuse themselves into them, succeed in foreign tongues, know how to have sympathy for all opinions, to put themselves in others' places, etc. The Italian (Roman) genius shares in the two extremes; embraces the objective idea and the subjective Me; is dialectical, because it founds itself in the principle of creation, not in psychologism nor in pantheism.

The natural equality of all men, and especially of the two civil extremes, the prince and the servant, is admirably expressed by Job (xxxi, 13-15), where allusion is made to the unity of origin, to the sameness of nature, and to the common fatherhood of God.

The cosmology of the schoolmen, and especially of Saint Thomas, has many excellent parts. Its principle fault is negative, and springs from the teleology, which places in man alone the end of the creation. Man is part of the end, not all; is telluric, not cosmic end. The total end is pure mentality, that is, the conversion of the Cosmos into Olympus, the mimesis into metessi. The totality of life is the endeavor of the sensible and sentient to become intelligible and intelligent. Such is the revealed cosmology of Saint Paul, much more ample than that of the schoolmen. Substitute the universal mentality for the partial, and you will have reduced to the truth the scholastic. The error of the scholastics was born of their false astronomy. The system of Ptolemy *i. e.*, tellurism, is in physics, and specially in cosmology, what psychologism is in metaphysics; that is, eccentricity substituted for true concentration. The Dorico-Tyrrhenic doctrine of the Pythagoreans repudiated tellurism. Plato when old repented of having embraced it. The tellurism of Aristotle, closely akin to his semi-sensism and semi-empirism, vitiated his philosophy. The Hellenism of Aristotle, very little worthy of the instructor of Alexander, was tellurism ap-

plied to politics, and hostile to cosmopolitism. Hence the slavery of some races approved by him ; hence not merely the Hellenic primacy, but the Hellenic tyranny. In the tellurism of Plato, Aristotle, Saint Thomas, there is therefore a contradiction, that is, the incorruption of the heavens opposed to the corruption of the earth. Because how can a corruptible globe ever be the centre of the universe ? The doctrine of the incorruptibility of the heavens is then a symbolical relic of astronomical ontologism, of the orthodox astronomy, which was the first Uranism. The incorruptibility of the heavens is the symbol of their intelligibility, of the metessi. The transfiguration of Christ was not of itself a metessi, but a simple approximation, and tekmerion of it. Because the metessi is not discernible with the eyes of the body, as says Saint Paul. The rapture of the Apostle to the third heaven was an intuition of the metessi. Note in fact that the intuition of the Divine essence is there conjoined with the uranic symbol, and with the doctrine of the centrality of the heavens. The Scholastic doctrine, that the salvation of the elect is the end of the universe, is substantially true, provided that under the name of *elect* is understood the the universality of the spirits ordained to bliss. The triumph of pure mentality, of the metessi, is the election, from which springs glory. Redemption is the means with which God re-established the metessi in relation to our earth, after the deviation of the telluric mimesi. Perhaps the effects of redemption extend also to other parts of the universe.

The imponderables (at least light, electricity and magnetism) offer two states, two distinct dynamic momenta: the one of which is unity, equilibrium, harmony, parallelism, generality, indifference; the other, duality or plurality, conflict, antagonism, difference, individualism, polarity. Light in this kind is the richest element, because it includes seven colors in its whiteness. It hence affords place not to duality only (polarity), but to multiplicity.

The universe begins with the fluid (ether); proceeds with its opposite, with the solid (minerals), and comes out into the har-

mony of the fluid with the solid (organized bodies). So, as to form, the perfect fluid is the point (simple force); the solid is the right line, represented by the crystalline needles which reunite themselves in rectilineal solids; the harmony of the fluid and of the solid is the harmony or synthesis of the point with the right line, whence emerge the curves, and the curves make the sphere. The right line makes the rectilineal solids, and the curve the spherical solids, by means of motion; and motion is the effect of the point, considered as force. Thus the geometrical genesis of the chronotope repeats itself in the cosmos.

Polarism consists of two principles. (1) Principle of homogeneity. The same tends to the same; the contrary is repugnant to the contrary. Is the Aristotelian principle of contradiction. Constitutes the neutral equatorial state of the dynamic powers. Manifests itself in the unity of the electric, magnetic fluid, etc. (2) Principle of heterogeneity. The same is repugnant to the same; the contrary tends to the contrary. Is the Hegelian principle of opposites. Constitutes the free polar state of the dynamic powers. Manifests itself in the duality of the electric, magnetic fluid, etc. The nexus of these two principles stands in the nature of force. Force is one and many. One potentially, many actually. The potential and initial unity of force constitutes the homogeneous principle; the actual and progressive multiplicity, the heterogeneous principle. But how can force be one and many? It is one, because existent; it is many, because astringent and finite. Force as real is unique. But its reality is limited. Now the limit is a negation. The negation of the same is the diverse. Therefore the finite positivity of the created force implies its negativity. Unity implies the multiplex. Negativity then implies diversity; because nothing can be limited except by the diverse and the contrary. The two principles of polarity proceed therefore from the principle of created force. And they are repugnant to the uncreated force. The cosmic harmony is the effect of the two principles of polarity.

Andover, Mass.

VI.

ENGLISH LITERATURE.

BY THEODORE APPEL, D.D.

HAVING spent a considerable length of time, over a year in all, in editing Professor Nevin's "Lectures on English Literature," I naturally became interested in the general subject. In fact, it absorbed my attention exclusively for the time being, and elicited a careful and thorough study. As a matter of course, it was the proper thing that, as editor, I should give only the ideas and, as far as possible, the words of the Professor; but, quite naturally, the editor had ideas or opinions of his own, in regard to the growth and history of literature in general, and of English literature in particular. Some of these thoughts or reflections, which had to be held in abeyance with some effort, we wish now to put on record whilst they are still fresh in our own mind.

History hitherto has, for the most part, been a record of the rise and fall of empires, of battles fought and won, of carnage and rivers of blood, of civil strife in which many Cains have killed many Abels without the least appearance of justification; all of which have presented the darkest pictures in the book of time; but whilst every day's report of wrong and outrage among men is thus described among the annals of nations, comparatively little is said of their internal progress, of their advancement from a state of savagery to civilization, culture and refinement, although these present many of the brightest pictures. This defect is remedied by the literature, which seems to spring up spontaneously amidst the briars and thorns along the highways of nations. This side of their history is by far more

interesting and valuable than their Marathons or their Water-loos; for these merely show the predominance of the lower, sensual nature of man; that he, like his dogs, delights to bark and bite. But the literature, which his more gifted sons and daughters bring forth, teaches us the better lesson: that man has a spiritual side, a higher and more elevated nature than the brute creation; that, bad and corrupt as the race has become, he has yearnings and aspirations for a higher order of life and existence; and that, as a consequence, there is some hope, based on these aspirations, of his future elevation into a sphere high above this temporal, natural, animal world surrounding him in the present. They resemble, in fact, the cries of an infant, or of a drowning man for help during a shipwreck.

All tribes or races of people have something of the nature of literature, or at least the beginnings thereof. It may consist merely of proverbs or wise sayings, handed down from father to son and sacredly cherished. It, however, soon assumes the form of rhythm, poetry or songs, and the authors of these songs travel about from place to place like blind Homer, or the more modern bards of Europe who sang their songs into the ears of delighted multitudes. The sacred books of India and other countries in Asia are all more or less of a poetical character. At first handed down as living traditions, they were at length transferred to the written page through the use of letters, and in that form they have come down from one generation to another to the present day. They are poetical, but at the same time historical, and they furnish us with the best data for the history of former times. In fact, some of our modern romances are truthfully historical, and give us a better idea of the spirit and progress of European nations than many of their professed historians. Such is the case with the wonderful romances of Sir Walter Scott. But, sooner or later, prose writers assert themselves, and, without supplanting either poets or romancers, do their best to furnish *their* pictures of the past and present. Some of these are monumental, and some are not. With less imagination, they help to supplement the works of the poet.

Authors generally present their best appearance; but this is owing to the fact that they are borne along by the general spirit of the times, which requires them to pay respect to the moral or religious tone of the community, or at least to be respectable in their utterances. We are, however, curious and inquisitive mortals, prone to look beyond the curtain and see what kind of men our great authors and writers were in their private lives. Accordingly, to our sad dismay, we find that, in many cases, the distance which separates between their best writings and their personal characters is quite palpable, if not world-wide. This sometimes serves as a stumbling-block to their readers, although, as we shall see, it ought not to be so. Certainly too many were very weak earthen vessels, and some of them, to be sure, as bad as bad could be: just as corrupt as their corrupt natures could make them.

We all know something about Byron, more indeed than we would just like to know; and Shelley was not any better, if not worse in his profanity and marriage relations; and yet these poets wrote some of the finest and best poetry in the English language, poetry which will last and be admired as long as the English language itself is spoken or read. Who does not admire Burns, and the many beautiful, noble sentiments for which he has given form and expression? But what was poor Burns in his private life? Not much better than a drunken sot, or at times an impure lecherous fellow. Coleridge gave a very healthful impulse to English literature, such as few before or after his time have done, by bringing into England for the first time German thoughts and ideas. His poetry is of a high order, and his prose, although much of it fragmentary, if not mere patchwork, is full of valuable thoughts and of many ideas, new to the English mind. But what was Coleridge in private life? Most persons would say he too was a weak earthen vessel. At one time a Unitarian preacher, then an Episcopalian, but for the most part addicted to the use of a poisonous herb, which the heathen Chinese once did their best to banish from their shore; and this, it is believed, shortened his days.

Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" is a masterpiece of historical writing, all based on the best historical authorities, which he had thoroughly studied himself, never borrowing them second-handed from other authors. It is said that he was accustomed not to write out a single sentence until he had fully formed it in his own mind; and that, as a consequence, he never had occasion to change or correct it afterwards. His volumes occupied him twelve years of incessant labor. His history is still authority for the period of time over which it extended, one of the great and best histories ever written. But what was Gibbon as a man? First a churchman, then a Roman Catholic; and for the rest of his life a skeptic, an unbeliever; and as such he infused into his great work the poison of infidelity in his covert attacks upon Christianity. Hume was also a great historian in his day and a master of style; although inferior to Gibbon as a historical writer, he was much his superior in his shameless assaults upon Christianity and divine revelation. He was a Scottish man, and of course a fighter. In this respect he went far ahead of English skeptics. He was, of course, a logician in his way; he thought he was simply carrying out the materialistic philosophy of Bacon and Locke, in trying to prove that miracles are contrary to reason. But how these two great authors would have been shocked had they lived to read the conclusions deduced from their philosophy. As it was, it was enough to make them move in their coffins, as people sometimes say. However, indirectly and without any intention on his part, Hume accomplished one useful result in his way: by reducing the shallow empiricism of his day to an *ad absurdum*. In regard to his private life there may be some difference of opinion. As death approached he assumed the air of real or affected indifference, not far removed from trifling.

But now let us consider the case of Milton, the poet-laureate of English Christendom. He certainly was a Christian and a moral man: most likely he did more for the progress of Christian England than any other one of her great authors. It is

true his wife ran away from him soon after her marriage, because, it is said, she and her friends thought he was on the wrong side of politics; although it is also true that two years afterwards, as soon as the political weather-cock had turned the other way, he took her back again into his house, when she came to him and on bended knee asked his pardon; but how could the author of "*Paradise Lost*" sit down and write a book to show that divorces were lawful whenever a married couple found that they were not congenial in their dispositions? Socinians or Unitarians have claimed Milton as being on their side, but here they have counted without their host. A good while after his death some of his unpublished manuscripts of a tentative character were raked up and published to the world, of course without his permission, which go to show that he leaned more towards Arius than to St. Athanasius. There is, however, nothing of the kind in his "*Paradise Lost*" or "*Regained*," where he always teaches the orthodox belief. Unfortunately, he dabbled in philosophy, for which he had no calling, and it may have led him somewhat from the narrow way, although not much.

But how was it with the great Sir Francis Bacon? He wrote many admirable essays on virtue, morality, and religion, which are still read with much interest and profit by those who wish to live virtuous and unblamable lives. As far as we know his life in general was consistent, in harmony with his pure precepts and maxims. Poor Bacon, however, plunged into politics, and reached the climax of his desires as Lord High Chancellor of England; but when he got there he was accused of bribery and corruption, found guilty, sent to prison, from which, fortunately, he was happily released before he had served out his time. What specific effect his fall had in humbling him, we do not know; but it seems pretty certain that he still retained no small amount of his natural pride and arrogance.

Coming down to the more modern periods, we find in Sir Walter Scott all the elements of a well-formed, virtuous man, whose works in poetry and prose are remarkably pure and ele-

vating. There is scarcely a line or a sentence in his numerous books to which the most prudish critic could file an objection. As he once said, it was with him a rule never to write a single line which he should wish to have expunged on his death-bed. In this purpose most persons would say he was successful. And yet Sir Walter, as it seems, also had a weak point somewhere in his otherwise well-balanced character. He wished to live in a lordly manor-house, out at Abbotsford, in the country, in which he was successful; but when he had erected his castle, he was involved in financial ruin, and notwithstanding his noble, herculean efforts to pay his creditors every cent, he was not successful; and his latter days, which might have been the brightest in his history, were clouded over, and his life probably shortened.

Other instances of weakness in distinguished authors might here be produced; but those just cited will be sufficient to show that a distinction ought to be made between them and their works. The latter are often far above the former in truthfulness and moral value. The reader will find a full account of the "Calamities" and "Quarrels" of authors in D'Israeli's works and in Burton's "Anatomy of Melancholy." It used to be said that the works of authors derelict in character ought to be tabooed—ruled out of our reading circles—on account of the weaknesses and frailties of the writers. But a rule like this would banish a large amount of our highest and best literature, even the Psalms of David and the Proverbs of Solomon, if rigidly enforced. Here, as well as elsewhere, we should make the right use of our common sense. If a man, whose private character is at a minimum, writes a book that is at a maximum, we should thank him for it: it shows that our poor, prostrate human nature, with all its elements of badness, has also in it elements of goodness, which struggle successfully at times to rise above a merely natural, sensual, or animal life.

As an off-set to the incongruities above mentioned, we might cite the cases of many authors of high repute who were as pure, as noble, as virtuous, as moral, and as sincerely Christian as

their books—as one instance, our own Washington Irving, a truthful Christian. The author of the “Spectator” lived at a period when authors were as much tempted to fall into habits of dissipation, frivolity, revelry and riot, as at any other period, and perhaps more so; but Joseph Addison was a true believer and a true Christian, and when the day of his departure approached, it is said, on good authority, that he sent for his thoughtless step-son to come and see how calm and peaceful a Christian could meet death. There was no darkness there, as in the case of Hobbes, who said, as his end approached, that death was “a leap into the dark.”

Sir Isaac Newton, the greatest name in the annals of English science, although often visited and applauded to the skies by French infidel astronomers, was a Christian, and never for a moment lost his faith in divine revelation. On the contrary, he was one of its ablest defenders in his day. His famous Scholium in his Principia, in which he had demonstrated the law of gravitation, has sometimes been ridiculed as something out of place, an intrusion in a mathematical work—as an evidence of his weakness. But any one, who will carefully study Sir Isaac's character, will see that it was the logical outcome of his course of reasoning, as much so as his other scholia or corollaries. A few extracts may be of interest to our readers at this late day, and we here give them as follows:

“This most beautiful system of the sun, planets and comets could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being. This Being governs all things, not as the Lord of the world, but as Lord over it; and on account of His dominion He is wont to be called the *Lord God* or Universal Ruler.—This Supreme God is a Being, infinite, eternal absolutely perfect; but a being, however perfect, without dominion, cannot be said to be Lord God.—And from His true dominion it follows that the true God is a living, intelligent and powerful Being; and, from His other perfections, that He is superior, or most perfect. He is eternal and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient: that is, His duration reaches from eter-

nity to eternity; His presence from infinity to infinity; He governs all things, and knows all things that are or can be done. God is the same God, always and everywhere. He is omnipresent not virtually only, but also substantially; for virtue cannot subsist without substance. The Supreme God exists, necessarily; and by the same necessity He exists *always* and *everywhere*. Whence He is all similar, all eye, all ear, all brain, all power to perceive, to understand, and to act; but in a manner not at all human, in a manner not at all corporeal, in a manner utterly unknown to us.—He is utterly void of all body and bodily figure, and can therefore neither be seen, nor heard, nor touched, nor ought to be touched under the representation of any corporeal thing. We know Him only by His most wise and excellent continuance of things and final causes; we admire Him for His perfections; but we reverence and adore Him on account of His dominion; for we adore Him as His servants; and a God without dominion, providence, and final causes, is nothing else but Fate and Nature. All that diversity of natural things, which we find suited to different times and places, could arise from nothing but the ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing. And thus much concerning God; to discourse of whom from the appearance of things certainly belongs to Natural Philosophy." We might go on and quote many other distinguished philosophers who were true believers, from Copernicus, Galileo, Boyle, Kepler, Euler, Bacon, Locke, and a host of others down to the present time, who simply reiterate the words of Newton, in harmony with the Bible, but in marked contrast with the language of modern agnostics. It is, however, not necessary for us to do so. In our day, we have many such witnesses, who if not any longer imprisoned or put to death, are nevertheless martyrs and belong to the noble army of martyrs.

As in the ages gone by, modern English literature has been largely influenced and modified by contact with the continental nations. England is insular, and that circumstance has tended to make her stand aloof with some disposition to look down upon her neighbors as her inferiors. But John Bull has not always

been able to do just what he wants to do. He has been very much in favor of trade and commerce, because they help to fill his pockets; but there is another kind of commerce—we may call it the commerce of literature—and that always goes along with that which is less spiritual; and John, with all his frowns, could not keep it away from his shores. Within the present century there have been large importations of German thoughts and ideas into his little island. In fact some of his children, lovers of learning, could not wait until it landed, but crossed the Straits of Dover, and sought to bring it over for themselves. Coleridge and Carlyle were among the first to manifest such audacity, and John could do nothing more than to stand by and look on. The land of Schiller and Goethe could send something more weighty than poetry and romance. Its stores of learning, of philosophy and theology, were offered as free gifts to all nations, and honest Englishmen were quite willing to accept of the offer; and even some of the English churchmen and theologians made free use of the foreign articles in giving a new impulse to English theology; not mechanically, of course, but in such a way as seemed best in the erection of a new theological fabric or basis of faith. Under these circumstances English literature, which is still distinctively Anglican, nevertheless possesses a more or less composite character, as much so as in years gone by, and perhaps more so.

Unfortunately, however, the introduction of foreign literature into England brought with it much of what was bad and pernicious as well as what was really good and beneficial. There was infidelity, quite enough of it, there as far back as Hobbes and Hume; but when German Rationalism crossed the channel the two met, embraced each other, and became bosom friends. The former, which had to some extent worn itself out for the want of something to say, in answer to the numerous attacks that had been made upon it, again took courage and believed that it had found a new lease of life. The more modern unbelief or skepticism in England is more plausible, but, at the same time, more dangerous than that which went before.

It is a remarkable fact that many of her best and most distinguished authors or writers at the present time are more or less rationalistic in their faith. This may not appear so much in what they say as in what *they do not say*. They write gracefully, and often with much force, in favor of the existence of God, and, as theists, they certainly have the better side of the argument. But what does that amount to? It is a thread-bare subject, handled with sufficient ability from the times of Greece and Rome, by Plato, Aristotle, Tully, and others, through the Christian dispensation, down to the present time. German unbelievers can very generally unite in the old refrain, "Ja, wir glauben alle in einem Gott;"¹ but that does not go as far as Christianity or the Christian faith, which is everywhere the faith of Christian nations. The great question of the day, as it has always been in the past, is, What think ye of Christ? Is He divine as well as human? Did He live and act before He was born of the Virgin Mary? Was He present in the wilderness with Moses, and was He the rock of which it is said all did drink? Was he present in the dawn of creation? Is it true that by Him all things were made, and that without Him was nothing made that was made?

The central question here is one of engrossing importance, and to every man or woman all-absorbing. If Christ is the *Son of God*, as He said He was, and as all Christian nations since His time on earth have believed, here, then, there is hope for the world of mankind. *There is a hereafter*, and believers are raised far above the region of scientific or philosophic doubt, and they need not go to schools which are filled with the misty page of *uncertainty*. Christian nations have answered the question in the affirmative, and upon this truth the entire fabric of their nationality, their laws and institutions—social, political and religious—are built; and if this were now removed, they would disintegrate and fall down from their present high position.

Here, then, in the Incarnation, in the Word made flesh, in the fact that the only begotten Son of God, conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, we have a firm founda-

tion on which to base our hopes. No other can be found that is like unto it. We may glean useful lessons from reason, from science, from philosophy, with the help of logic; but these sources of knowledge, with regard to the main question, are merely moonlight to us poor mortals, who are of yesterday. They can make it appear as something plausible that God is God, that there is a future life, and that men may attain unto it; but there are always two sides to this as well as other questions, and when both are heard the human mind is left in more or less *uncertainty*. But just as men can come to look upon the Incarnate Christ as Immanuel, as God-with-us, all doubt vanishes; the mist of the dark night of uncertainty passes away; the Sun of Righteousness arises in auroral splendor to give us the true light; and there is a great calm in our troubled minds. As the Son of God He is almighty, but as the Son of Man He is related to us, and by His uniting Himself to men, and imparting to them His pure human life, He raises them up above the dominion of sin and death, and the powers of the infernal world. When they come to possess such a faith as something central in their being, science, philosophy, education, culture, can do them no harm, nor tempt them in any way towards skepticism. On the contrary, these lesser lights find their proper complement in Christianity, and can be made to render an incalculable service in fighting the good fight of faith, especially so in preparing us to discharge our distinctive duties in life, in the fulfilment of the several missions or callings that fall to our lot.

This Christian standpoint pervades English and American literature to a greater or less extent. But here as well as elsewhere, where burning questions are involved, there is a left wing as well as a right wing and a centre. German rationalism passing over into England, gave a new impulse to the old worn-out deism and skepticism of the day; and, sad to say, this passed over into America, and there took root, more particularly in Unitarianism. We all admire such authors as Everett, Channing, Whittier, Emerson, Holmes, Longfellow, and even Theodore Parker, as fine-cultured writers. They stand very high in the

temple of literary fame; but it cannot, nor ought it to be forgotten, that, however near some of them stand to the truth, they are all rationalists or rationalistic, and that we must say to the best among them, "One thing thou lackest." Their works speak for themselves, sometimes assaulting the central truth of Christianity, but for the most part simply ignoring it or passing it by.

In England the rationalistic, Socinian left wing has reached out much further and tried to cover a much wider area than with us, culminating in agnosticism, in which humanity or man is the proper object of worship, and such stately writers as Huxley and Spencer are the high priests. It seems that errors as old as the centuries gone by are bound to assert and re-assert themselves under new forms, clad in new garments, although they are as old as the hills. The public will thank them for the fine literature they are trying to produce. They are in fact, simply the classes; but in our age the masses rule, and the common people, the common mind, may be depended on to hold fast the profession of their faith that Jesus is the Son of God—to sift out the germs of truth in all books and to cast away the dirt.

As already said, these reflections have been awakened in our mind whilst engaged in editing Professor Nevin's lectures. We leave to others to speak of the merits of this new work. We here merely cull a few extracts from the highly favorable notices of the work, as given by some of our neighbors of the public press:

There he sits, our dear Professor Nevin, among his students, the one most beloved of all the Professors that ever served in the institutions at Mercersburg or Lancaster. Just as he sits in his picture in this book, so I often saw him in his class-room: his hair, his beard, his dress, quite natural and always neat. He sits at his desk, turned to one side, with an open book before him, supporting his right arm upon the back of the chair, resting his head upon his closed hand. Thus he appears in his

picture in the front part of this book, with his peaceful frame of mind, absorbed in his beautiful thoughts. His name is written underneath, in the same round, careful hand-writing as it appears in my album and diploma. So he lives in my college recollections, as he was accustomed to greet me with his smiling countenance. His picture and this entire book bear the impress of his refined culture, of his man-loving and meek spirit. Our columns will not allow us to make quotations from this work. Those who can read intelligently and wish to become acquainted with the best specimens of English literature should purchase this book—and study it also for themselves. The gifted man here spreads out before us a rich table. To this nourishing and tastefully prepared feast he invites all as welcome guests. How his old friends will enjoy themselves at this table! To me it is a precious treasure. I will take it along with me on my summer's rest. In the refreshing breezes of ocean's shore, out on the high hills, in the cool shade, and amidst the silent whisperings beneath the pine trees, I will enjoy myself by perusing this book in sweet communion with my honored teacher in my childhood days.—*Dr. Bausman in the Hausfreund.*

The appearance of Professor Nevin's "Lectures on the History of English Literature" is an important event in the literary history of the Reformed Church. He was thoroughly familiar with the works of the great masters of literature, and had himself produced poems and essays which were justly regarded as possessing a high order of excellence. That the work of preparing the volume for the press became to its editor, Dr. Theodore Appel, a "labor of love," need hardly be mentioned, and the result of his self-denying toil is a volume of which the friends of Professor Nevin can be proud. The lectures are no mere compilation. The materials have indeed been gathered from many sources; but they have been moulded into a harmonious whole. The book is like a house whose stones have been chosen in distant lands; but the structure is due to the genius of the architect. Professor Nevin could never have produced

a merely empirical work. He sought for principles and causes, and we have, therefore, a full account of the elements from which English literature was derived. He begins with the Church, which he aptly designates as "the bridge across the Dark Ages, between ancient and modern literature." Thence he proceeds to the Feudal System and the Renaissance. In this way room is made for the fundamental elements from which early English literature is derived. That the Professor was a master of English style is generally acknowledged. He was no copyist: he had studied his favorite authors, such as Addison, Goldsmith and Irving, until his composition was as pure and clean as theirs. In much of his writings there is also a certain playful humor which suggests Charles Lamb. The production of such a volume is a credit to the Reformed Church and her institutions, and we therefore hope that the work will receive the general appreciation which it so manifestly deserves.—*Reformed Church Messenger*.

Professor Nevin was a man of very wide learning and of catholic sympathy. He prepared his own lectures upon an unusually comprehensive scale, which makes them a consecutive summary of the development of English literature in its relation with political and religious history. Dr. Nevin's religious attitude properly colors his critical judgment, and that attitude is one of extraordinary breadth of view and spiritual appreciation, alike of the freedom of modern thought and of the devotion of the ages of faith. Without pretending to original discovery, he presents his subject with a clearness of vision and attractiveness of manner that make this volume one of very uncommon value.

Indeed, for the ground it covers within a reasonable space, it holds a position quite distinctive. While no man would attempt to write the history of a literature without reference to the conditions of civilization expressed in it, very many writers treat these conditions merely as incidentals or illustrations, rather than essentials. Dr. Nevin's is the true philosophical concep-

tion. In tracing the general course of intellectual activity to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, to the political development of England and the currents of religious thought, he points out the underlying influences that find expression in literature. His view of the New Learning and the Renaissance is singularly appreciative, and it would be difficult to find a more judicious view of English history at the period of the Reformation, leading up to the Elizabethan era and its splendid literary efflorescence.—*The Philadelphia Times.*

At the commencement of Franklin and Marshall College in 1892, the alumni association appointed a committee, consisting of Hon. W. U. Hensel, ex-attorney-general of the commonwealth, Walter M. Franklin, Esq., and Dr. Theodore Appel, to prepare the lectures of William Marvel Nevin, LL.D., for publication. The result of this committee's work appears in a neat volume, entitled "The History of English Literature," containing the lectures delivered by the professor whilst occupying the chair of English Literature in the college. The volume, edited by Dr. Theodore Appel, is issued by the committee named in behalf of the alumni association, as a memorial in behalf of Professor Nevin. The lectures are the result of profound and scholarly study of the rise and progress of letters among the Anglo-Saxon races. An introductory lecture outlines the scope of the work. Then follows a sketch of mediæval literature, showing how English literature grew therefrom. Part two deals with Anglo-Saxon literature, and brings the history down to the beginning of the thirteenth century. Part three takes up English literature proper. The first section of this division goes back to the Norman Conquest; but, whilst the time overlaps that covered by the preceding part, there is no duplication. Instead, the reader feels that he is following an author whose studious carefulness has presented his readers with a thorough and accurate history. Part four discusses Celtic and Scottish literature. In part five, under the title "Some Modern Authors," the makers of the literature of the latter half of the eighteenth century

and of the nineteenth century are taken up. In addition to the English writers of this period, the editor, perhaps, has devoted several sections of the work to American authors, including Bryant, Emerson, Whittier, Longfellow. Part six contains selections of Professor Nevin's writings, with a sketch of his life. The Professor devoted his life to the study of literature, and his lectures are not only entertaining, but are accurate, embellished with scholarly thought. The book issued by Franklin and Marshall's alumni will not only be a worthy memorial to the life of an able teacher, but will be found a valuable addition to any library, public or private.—*The Pittsburg Leader.*

The publication of the late Professor William M. Nevin's *Lectures on English Literature*, serves within the past few weeks to recall one of the most amiable and courteous of gentlemen, one of the most accomplished of instructors, and a man whose literary tastes were as sound and healthful as they were appreciative and catholic. For years he came and went among us, silent, thoughtful, and unobtrusive, yet possessing a nature keenly alive to all that was passing about him, living another life among his books, from which he drew his highest enjoyment. The very modesty of the man kept his highest merits from public sight and knowledge. But in these *Lectures on English Literature* much of the genius of the man is revealed to us. How well read, how appreciative his mind, and how deeply the best literature influenced him, is fully seen in these literary remains. It was undoubtedly a labor of love on the part of his former associate in Franklin and Marshall College, Dr. Theodore Appel, to gather these lectures and other literary memorabilia of Professor Nevin and give them to his old-time friends and admirers, as well as to the public at large. The work is excellently well done, and deserves the best thanks of all who were either friends or pupils of that most gentle of scholars and of Christian gentleman. The book is well adapted for general reading, and should have a wide circulation. Free from

pedantry and pretension, it is a book to charm as much by its graces of style as its genuine appreciation of all that is best and noblest in our mother-tongue.—*The Lancaster New Era*.

It is certainly a strong testimonial to the worth of a man's life-work that those who have known him in the field of his labors should unite after his death in the publication of a volume of his lectures—literally samples of his skill and learning—and should dedicate that volume to the memory of “an honored teacher, a cultivated scholar, a polished gentleman, an humble Christian, and a man without guile.” Such is the affectionate dedication by many admiring pupils and friends upon the memorial volume of “Lectures in the History of English Literature by Professor William Marvel Nevin, LL.D., edited by Rev. Theodore Appel, D.D.” There could be no better memorial of such a man than the publication of such a volume, for it exemplifies at once the general breadth and excellence of his scholarship, and the rare abilities with which he modestly applied his original ideas of literature. Most men, if they had been capable of evolving any similar scheme of lectures, would have hastened to publish them as a strong bid for name and fame, but Professor Nevin was content to deliver them to his classes in the conscious line of his duty; and now that he has gone, those that were benefited by his teachings fairly pay this tribute to his memory. In the Introductory Lecture the diversity in the Arts and Literature of the Northern and Southern Nations of Europe is presented with graphic force and clearness, and we see these two elements meeting in the literature of England, and finally combining with rare harmony in Milton, then passing under the romantic influence of France and Italy, and on through the Classic Period to Scott, Tennyson and modern times. No one with a grain of literary taste, or a sense of the force and beauty of true literary art, can read this lecture without wishing to read more; and it is a wish that should be gratified, for the volume is a splendid study of a noble topic, written in a style at once dignified and graceful; and it is safe to say

that, if it had been published and widely circulated during the life-time of the author, it would have carved for him a wide and well deserved fame as a master in that art.—*The Lancaster Intelligencer.*

English literature of the nineteenth century has passed through its present era of growth with Tennyson; and at the end of the present century; it will most likely enter upon a new course of development, for which there is abundant room. It must throw off its rationalistic elements, and become, not only profoundly but truly Christian. Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, and Milton represented truthfully the religious spirit of the respective ages in which they lived; and so the literature of the twentieth century should, and as we hope and believe it will, express more truthfully the real religious spirit of Christendom, which at bottom is Christian, not deistic, theistic, or agnostic, but simply Christian, that is, the old faith in the Son of God and in the Son of Man, which is Christocentric.

VII.

DEATH AND THE RESURRECTION.

BY REV. JOHN M. TITZEL, D. D.

OUR heading is the title of a book written by Rev. Calvin S. Gerhard, D. D., and recently published by Charles G. Fisher, 907 Arch Street, Philadelphia. A brief notice of this book appeared in the July number of this REVIEW for the current year. The importance of the subjects of which it treats, and the somewhat peculiar views advanced with regard to them, however, demand that the work should be more extensively and thoroughly reviewed for the benefit of our readers. To present such review is the purpose of the present paper.

Dr. Gerhard, the author of this book, as most of our readers are aware, is an earnest, faithful and successful minister of the Reformed Church, and heartily accepts all the articles of "our Catholic, undoubted Christian faith." Accordingly the object of his book is not to combat, or to find fault with any of these articles, but simply so to explain them as to bring them into harmony with what he believes to be established facts of the advanced science of our times. In our criticism of his views as expressed in the volume before us, we would not, therefore, be understood as in any way impugning his Christian character or faith, but merely as pointing out errors into which, we believe, he has inadvertently fallen.

The book itself gives evidence of extensive reading and of earnest and profound thought on the part of its author. It is, however, a maiden effort, and as such is possessed of many of the defects that usually characterize such efforts. Though written in clear and forcible English, it is yet by no means free

from ungrammatical and badly constructed sentences. Thus, for example, we have on page 19, "These great truths, under the influence of which, some to a greater degree than others, the sacred writers lived and wrote;" on page 21, "the antidote at once both for atheism and materialism, as well as for agnosticism and pantheism"; on page 33, "did he sin individually, but brought upon mankind the taint of his corrupt nature"; on page 93, "the early Hebrews believed that, although their friends were dead and buried, they had not perished"; on page 156, "Why were the eleven terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they saw a ghost?" And again on the page last named, "Its identity was preserved, not through the glorification of His corpse, but through the activity of His bodily life, now asserting itself through a corporeity no longer subject to the laws of natural life, but being lifted above all dependence upon the outward world, was filled, guided and borne by the spirit." Such faulty sentences occur all through the book and greatly detract from its literary merits.

The book is also defective, as regards its method of treating the subjects under consideration. The true nature of death and of the resurrection can be learned only through divine revelation. Both lie beyond the province of science. In treating of them, therefore, the Scriptures should always have a first place. Dr. Gerhard, however, first considers them from a scientific and philosophical point of view, and then seeks to make the Scriptures harmonize with the conclusions at which he has thus arrived. It is scarcely necessary to say, that this course of procedure will almost inevitably result in error. Then the order in which the subjects are considered is not as progressive and complete as it should be. First we have a somewhat lengthy introductory section which contains considerable extraneous matter. This is followed by eleven chapters, which, in the following order, treat respectively of Physical and Spiritual Death, the Future Life, Ancient Beliefs, Jesus Christ and the Future Life, the Resurrection of the Dead, the Resurrection of Christ, the Forty Days, the Resurrection from the

Dead, the Great Consummation, a Study of First Corinthians xv., and a Study of Misapplied Texts. In reflecting on these topics in the order in which they occur a certain want of strict logical sequence can scarcely fail to make itself felt. Indeed one can hardly help coming to the conclusion that the different chapters were originally distinct essays, and that the book is rather a collection of such essays, than an originally conceived and well-arranged whole. The many repetitions which occur in the different chapters also favor this view of its origin.

Throughout the volume, moreover, there is a notable looseness of reasoning, and an unguardedness of expression. Often when the premises of an argument are admitted to be only probably correct, the conclusion deduced is presented as something indisputably proved. The careful reader of the work will consequently find not a few statements which, though very positively made, are, nevertheless, of a very questionable character, and sometimes even directly contradictory. To some of these statements we invite special attention. On page 21 of his book, Dr. Gerhard says: "God has so constituted man that such things" (as the natural processes and forces through which the Creator has brought the world into the form in which we know it, and the proper interpretation of the phenomena of nature) "must always be learned, not from the book of revelation, but from the book of nature." Now we admit that God has not seen proper to reveal to men what they can learn without revelation; but we do not admit that there is any proof, or any reason to believe, that man is so constituted that God could not make such revelation if He saw proper so to do; furthermore, we do believe that the sacred writers have in many cases more correctly interpreted the phenomena of nature through inspiration of the Holy Spirit than any scientists have done by deductions from their experiments. On page 113 we are told that Christ "put Himself *en rapport* with His age and people." To be *en rapport*, according to one of our latest authorities, is to be "in a connection of mutual understanding or sympathy." Was this the connection in which Jesus stood with His age and

people? If so, how came they to revile Him, and to condemn and crucify Him, and to persecute, as they did, His disciples? On page 117 we are further told of Christ, that "He Himself stood within the bosom of the theological thinking of His age." Is this true? Not, if what Dr. Gerhard states in the sentence immediately following be correct, *namely*, that "some things which were taught by the Pharisees He accepted, because He recognized them as true, while others He rejected, because He saw they were false." In reality Jesus was not *en rapport* with His age and people, but only with the few who were prepared to receive Him as the Messiah; and He stood not within the bosom of the theological thinking of His age, but in the bosom of divine truth. On page 21 the following statement is made: "Man cannot by searching, find out God, or the relation which He sustains to the universe. Natural laws and phenomena reveal Him not." On page 22 we are told: "Creation and Providence reveal His presence in upholding the world and in constantly unfolding His thoughts by evolving higher forms of existence and of life through the operation of natural laws which are the continuous expression of His will." These two statements, it is scarcely necessary to say, directly contradict each other. Perhaps it will be replied, there is Scripture for both statements. But this is a mistake. In Job it is not said that by searching we cannot find out God, but only that we cannot find Him out unto perfection. Dr. Watson, in his exposition of the Book of Job, gives the following rendering of the words of Zophar.

"Canst thou find the depths of Eloah?
Canst thou reach to the end of Shaddai?"

Again on page 94 we read, "There never is any reference to burial or the body when the word Sheol is used." In the pages immediately following, in which the translation of Sheol in King James' version, and also in the revised version, is severely criticised, Gen. 42: 48 is rendered, "If mischief befall him by the way in which ye go, then shall ye bring down my gray hairs with sorrow to Sheol;" and 1 Kings 2: 6, "Let not his hoar

head go down to Sheol in peace." In comparing what is said on page 94 with the passages just given, one feels prompted to ask, Do not *gray hairs* and *hoar head* belong to the body? And if they do, how can it truly be said that there is never any reference to the body when Sheol is used? Undoubtedly, this assertion is an unguarded one, and it greatly weakens the author's criticism of our authorized and revised versions of the sacred Scriptures. Many similar inconsistencies might yet be pointed out; but those to which attention has been called are sufficient to show that our criticism is by no means unwarranted.

As for the views set forth in the volume, with regard to the true nature of death and the resurrection, we consider them as altogether unsatisfactory. Interest, however, attaches to them because they differ from those generally accepted by the Church. But the author has utterly failed, in our opinion, to prove their correctness, or to show that they are more in accord with the established facts of science than the views commonly entertained by Christians. In our judgment, indeed, they create more difficulties than they remove. Moreover, if generally accepted and believed, they would, we are disposed to think, injure the cause of true vital piety by lowering men's conceptions of the terrible consequences of sin, and the unspeakable greatness of redemption.

Physical death, Dr. Gerhard maintains, is not a consequence of sin. Only spiritual death is the direct result of man's transgression. The latter, indeed, affects the former, produces the fear and mental distress which generally are associated with it, and often hastens it; but it is not the originating cause thereof. If man had not sinned he would have been, nevertheless, subject to physical death.

This view is not original with our author. It was held by Pelagius in the early Church, and by the Socinians in later times. It is also held by rationalists, and others who claim to be advanced thinkers, in our own times. By the great body of the Church it has been, however, in all times rejected as unscriptural and, therefore, erroneous.

In favor of the view it is claimed that death was in the world before man, that the very constitution of man's nature makes it a necessity, and that all men, the regenerate as well as the unregenerate, are subject to its power. It is also claimed that the Scriptures favor this view, and we are referred in proof of this to Gen. 3: 19; John 12: 24; and 1 Corinthians, 15: 47-50.

But the fact that physical death was in the world before man is absolutely no proof that man was originally created necessarily subject to physical death. For man differs from all that preceded him on the earth, in that he is a spiritual as well as a physical being; and this in itself warrants the supposition that his end was designed to be different from that of the merely animal creation. The possession of a physical body by man is also no proof of its necessary dissolution, for there is ample scientific evidence that the spiritual in man can modify and change the physical without disintegrating it. Neither does the fact that the regenerate die afford any proof that man would have been subject to death if he had not sinned; for the regenerate are not yet wholly delivered from sin, and, indeed, will not be before the restitution of all things. There is, therefore, no conclusive scientific evidence that man would have died if he had not sinned. On the contrary, so far as science bears any testimony whatever in the case, it is in favor of the commonly-accepted view that man would not be subject to death if there were no sin. "Perfect correspondence," says Herbert Spencer, "would be perfect life. Were there no changes in the environment but such as the organism had adapted changes to meet, and were it never to fail in the efficiency with which it met them, there would be eternal existence." Now, man without sin would be in perfect correspondence with his environment, and, therefore, according to Mr. Spencer, free from death.

As for the Scripture passages referred to, these also give no real support whatever to the doctrine under consideration. When it is remembered that the words in Gen. 3: 19, "For

dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return," form part of the sentence pronounced by the Lord on Adam after his transgression, it is evident that they must mean : *Because thou hast disobeyed and eaten of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt return unto dust out of which thou wast formed ;* and not, *Because thou wast taken out of the ground, thou shalt return unto it again.* So, also, John 12 : 24, and 1 Corinthians, 15 : 47-50, can be interpreted only as implying that man was made to die, and that, therefore, under no circumstances, could he be fitted for a heavenly life without the dissolution of his present body, by reading into them what was not in the mind of Jesus or of St. Paul when they were spoken and written.

That the Scriptures do not teach what Dr. Gerhard claims they teach, we feel perfectly assured. No one, we think, who will read them without a preconceived theory which he desires to establish, can fail to be convinced that, according to the inspired writers of both the Old and the New Testament, it was not designed that man should be inevitably subject to physical death, but that this has come to be his universal doom because of sin. This, as already indicated, has been the doctrine of the Church from the very beginning. And it has been so not without great reason. The best Biblical scholars of our own times, as well as of the past, hold that this is the teaching of Scripture. Dr. Franz Delitzsch, the noted Hebrew scholar, in his *New Commentary on Genesis*, published only a few years before his death, says, "Man by sin withdrew himself from communion with God, and his nature from the sway of the spirit, and is now a natural structure exposed to the coming and departing of natural life around him, and finally to dissolution. His path which was to tend upwards, is now to lead downwards into the darkness of the grave and Hades" (Eng. Trans., Vol. I., p. 169). M. Piepenbring, in his *Theology of the Old Testament*, bears the following testimony as to its teaching on the subject : "The translation of Enoch and Elijah seems to indicate that man was not necessarily subject to death, that death was not

inseparable from human nature. The same thought occurs in the prophetic declaration that foretells the abolition of death under the reign of the Messiah. We see, finally, that dead bodies, and all that came into contact with them, were regarded as unclean and defiled, as things for which God feels repulsion, and which He cannot have desired. It also follows from a multitude of other passages too numerous to be cited here that death, while appearing natural, is yet, according to the Old Testament as a whole, the result and the principal penalty of sin" (Eng. Trans., p. 264). Similar testimony is also borne by Dr. Hermann Schultz in his *Old Testament Theology*. His words are: "Man was taken out of the dust. Viewed from this standpoint, it would be only natural that he should return to the dust. But in Eden the tree of life was growing, hence it was possible that man in paradise, that is, humanity without actual sin, might eat also of this tree, and thus live like the Elohim forever. That man succumbs to death is, therefore, not merely a natural law, but also a divine judgment" (Eng. Trans., Vol. II., p. 316). Dr. Bernhard Weiss, in his *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*, makes this statement: "As in the original apostolic preaching, so also in Paul, physical death expressly appears, according to the Old Testament view, as the punishment appointed for sin in consequence of the judicial ordinance of God" (Eng. Trans., Vol. I., p. 330). Dr. Hermann Cremer, in his *Biblico-theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek*, in treating of *θανατος*, death, defines it primarily as "*The natural (especially forcibly caused) end of life,*" and then says: "In order to the clear perception and understanding of the Scriptural, and especially of the New Testament, use of this word, we must hold fast and abide by the fact that death as the punishment pronounced by God upon sin, has a punitive significance." He further adds: "*θανατος* does not occur in Biblical Greek, with the commonly recognized meaning, 'a state of moral and spiritual insensibility or deadness.'"

Many other eminent authorities might be quoted to show that the Scripture view of death, in the opinion of the best

Biblical scholars of our times, is different from that presented in the book before us. Dr. Gerhard himself refers to Martensen and Meyer and Godet as holding the view that man would not have died if he had not sinned. To those acquainted with the character of Meyer's "Commentary" it cannot be but surprising that Meyer is charged with being unduly influenced by the traditional view. It must also be surprising, if not amusing, to find Dr. Gerhard trying to persuade himself and his readers that the views of these theologians logically imply the same as his own, by maintaining that transformation and death are essentially the same. The height of absurdity is, indeed, reached when it is said: "The worm must pass away, must die, in order that the butterfly may be formed and live. In this case both have natural bodies, but here already the construction or formation of the butterfly involves the destruction and dissolution of the worm." Every one acquainted with natural history knows that the butterfly is only a fully developed and transformed caterpillar. The worm does not die that the butterfly may be formed and live. On the contrary, if the worm be injured so that it dies and its dissolution takes place, there will be no butterfly. By such reasoning as we have in the passage just given, anything may be proved, as all distinctions are ignored in thus using words and confounding their meaning.

In full accordance with the doctrine of death is the doctrine of the resurrection presented in the volume which we are reviewing. As death belongs to God's original plan of the world, so also does the resurrection of the dead. All men, accordingly, are not raised because Christ was raised, but He was raised because all men are raised. His resurrection only differs from that of other men in that in Him the resurrection of the dead is for the first time fully consummated, and thus the sting of death is taken away and the grave robbed of its terrors. Death, it is maintained, is really only the close of the present life, and the resurrection the beginning of another and a higher life. In death man lays aside the earthly body, and in the resurrection assumes a spiritual body. The resurrection, moreover,

takes place immediately on death. The spiritual body, however, will attain its complete consummation only at the consummation of all things. This latter fact accounts for its being associated in the Scriptures with the last day.

In support of this view Dr. Gerhard maintains that it is taught in the Scriptures, especially in what Christ said in his conversation with the Sadducees, Luke 20: 37, 38, and in what St. Paul has written in 1 Corinthians 15: 12-19, 36-50, and in 2 Corinthians, 5: 1-4. He also claims that it is favored by the psychological doctrine, which he accepts as proved, that "mind and body, consciousness and brain, are evolved as different forms of one and the same being," and that "we have no right to take mind and body for two beings or substances in reciprocal interaction." "Since the principle of individual human life," he says, "can express itself only in the double form of mind and body in this world, the law of analogy at once leads us to conclude that it will most likely be able to express itself only in a similar manner in the next world, and that therefore the mind can survive only, provided that when the body perishes under one form, it nevertheless in some real sense survives and unfolds under another form."

But the evidence presented does not prove what it is designed to prove. No unbiased reader of the Scriptures will be likely to find in them the view maintained. The very word resurrection itself is against it. It is unnatural to understand it as equivalent to transformation. Then the fact that the resurrection is always referred to as something future is opposed to such view. To say that it is thus spoken of because only at the last day it will be fully consummated, is virtually to charge the sacred writers with using words without any proper discrimination as to their meaning. Furthermore, the manner in which the intermediate state is spoken of in Scripture cannot be reconciled with it. Those who are dead are said to be asleep, and at the last day they are represented as awaking from their sleep. But sleep and waking differ not merely in degree, but in kind; and inasmuch as the Scriptures consider men in this life

as being awake, and at death as having fallen asleep, and in the resurrection as being again awakened, they clearly imply that the final state will be more akin to the present than to the intermediate state. That Christ, in refuting the Sadducees, should merely show that the dead were still living unto God, does not prove, as is claimed, that the future life and the resurrection are identical. The Sadducees denied the resurrection because they denied that the spirit existed consciously after death. Had they believed in the continued existence of the spirit, they would, undoubtedly, like the Pharisees, have believed in the resurrection, as an eternally imperfect state of existence would have seemed to them to be unreasonable. Therefore in proving to them that after death the higher spiritual life still continued in conscious existence, Jesus virtually proved to them that there would be a resurrection, and not that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob had already risen from the dead. As regards the passages referred to in 1 Corinthians xv., these are only seemingly made to favor the view set forth by pressing the analogies adduced by the apostle beyond their proper limits. There is really nothing in these passages in any way in conflict with the commonly received view. On the contrary, when properly understood they are in perfect harmony with it so far as the substance of this view is concerned. The same may be said of 2 Corinthians, 5: 1-4. This passage, if considered in connection with verses 5-8 of the same chapter, as it must be to be rightly understood, is certainly inconsistent with the theory that the resurrection always immediately follows death.

As for the claim that, in man, body and spirit are so related that they cannot be separated without wholly destroying conscious existence, there is really no conclusive evidence that such is the case. It is merely an assumption. In proof of this, we call attention to the following words of Prof. John Fiske: "Cerebral physiology says nothing about another life. Indeed, why should it? The last place in the world to which I should go for information about a state of things in which thought and feeling can exist without a cerebrum would be cerebral physiol-

ogy. The materialistic assumption that there is no such state of things, and the life of the soul accordingly ends with the life of the body, is perhaps the most colossal instance of baseless assumption that is known to the history of philosophy. No evidence of it can be alleged beyond the familiar fact that during the present life we know soul only in its association with the body, and therefore cannot discover disembodied soul without dying ourselves. This fact must always prevent us from obtaining direct evidence for the belief in the soul's survival. But a negative presumption is not created by the absence of proof in cases where, in the nature of things, proof is inaccessible." ("The Destiny of Man," p. 110). The assumption, moreover, is in direct conflict with the teachings of Scripture. For in them we read: "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul" (Gen. 2:7). In these words it is clearly implied that soul and body are of distinct origin, and not merely different sides of one and the same thing. In full harmony with this is the statement that "the dust shall return to the earth as it was, and the spirit unto God, who gave it" (Eccl. 12:7); the dying cry of Jesus: "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit" (Luke 23:46); and the words of St. Stephen when being stoned to death: "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit" (Acts 7:59). That the soul may exist apart from the body is implied also in the saying of Jesus: "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matt. 10:28); in the words of St. Paul: "We are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord" (2 Cor. 5:8), and "I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago (whether in the body I cannot tell; or whether out of the body, I cannot tell; God knoweth); such a one caught up to the third heaven" (2 Cor. 12:2); and in the words of St. James: "For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also" (James 2:26). In accordance with this view, the inspired writer of the Epistle to

the Hebrews speaks of the sainted dead as being "spirits of just men made perfect" (Heb. 12:23), and St. Peter of the disobedient who perished in the flood, as being, at the time of Christ's death, "spirits in prison" (1 Pet. 3:19). It is true, Dr. Gerhard maintains that in the last two passages referred to there is "nothing in reference to disembodied souls," and that those called "spirits" are persons who have been raised from the dead and "subsist through a spiritual body." But inasmuch as Jesus, after his resurrection, said to his disciples, "Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I, myself; handle me and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have" (Luke 24:39), it must be evident to every unprejudiced mind that "spirits" cannot mean persons who have been raised from the dead and are possessed of bodies, and that so to interpret the word is a species of jugglery in interpretation which tends to make certainty as regards Scripture teaching utterly impossible.

But the theory of the resurrection maintained by Dr. Gerhard in his book is not only without real scientific and Scripture support, but it is also beset by insuperable difficulties. Instead of harmonizing Scripture and science, it really brings them at many points into conflict. The theory assumes, as already stated, that body and soul cannot be separated without the destruction of conscious, personal being. Hence it is claimed that death is not a dissolution of soul and body, but only a transformation of the latter, such as takes place when the caterpillar is changed into a butterfly. But such change of the caterpillar, we know, takes place only when it has reached a certain state of development. And this is always the case. When ripened wheat or corn is harvested, it may be sown, and it will produce other wheat or corn. But if it be harvested when very immature, the grains will shrivel, and, if sown, will produce nothing. Now death comes to men at all periods of their life. The greater part of mankind, indeed, die in infancy and early youth, before their mental, moral and spiritual powers are at all developed. This being the case, it is contrary to all analogy that death at all periods of life should be simply transformation, or the pass-

ing from one state of existence into another as regards the whole being. But if death is not always transformation in the case of man, then we cannot conceive of its ever being such; and, if the soul cannot personally and consciously exist apart from the body, we are, consequently, compelled to hold, with Prof. Hæckel and Dr. Carus, that death ends all as regards our conscious existence. This is, however, in direct conflict with the teaching of Scripture, as all our readers will no doubt admit.

Then take the case of Lazarus, whom Jesus called back to this life again after he had been dead for four days. Accepting the Scripture view that body and soul are separated at death, this miracle is easily and rationally explained. Jesus, by divine power, brought soul and body together again, and then Lazarus came forth from his grave. But, according to the theory we are considering, as soon as Lazarus was dead he was clothed with a spiritual body, and this was given to him as an eternal possession. The question naturally presents itself, When Lazarus was raised from the dead, what became of his spiritual body? It could not be separated from the soul, and yet it could not be enclosed in the resurrected body; for we are expressly told that the sensuous body does not enclose the spiritual, and that the latter is only potentially present in the former. Perhaps it will be said that it was forced back again into mere potentiality. But would not such an explanation involve an absurdity?

Another difficult question raised by the theory is, How can consciousness immediately follow death? There can be no consciousness apart from the body it is claimed, and, furthermore, it is also claimed that the actual development of the spiritual body begins only at death. Now, Jesus said to the penitent thief on the cross, "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, to-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise" (Luke, 23: 43). This saying implies that the penitent would be conscious immediately after death. But is it not at variance with our scientific knowledge that a body which would reach its complete development only in the course of thousands of years, nevertheless should be, in a few hours, so developed as to enable its possessor the full enjoyment of conscious existence?

It is, however, in its application to the resurrection of Christ Himself, that the worst features of the theory become manifest. When Jesus arose on the morning of the third day after His death, His body, which was laid in the grave, did not come forth, but was miraculously resolved into its original elements. He appeared to His disciples in His spiritual body which was only "the perfected counterpart, in the spiritual world, of His earthly body." When He presented Himself to His disciples, and said to them, "Behold my hands and my feet that it is I myself: handle me and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have," He only "adapted himself to the needs of His disciples, who could not at once rise up to the proper apprehension of His new resurrection life. As before His death He performed miracles for their benefit by reaching up into the sphere above nature, so now He reached down from His higher sphere of glorification and recalled into activity the natural forces which He no longer needed for Himself in their earthly form." It is scarcely necessary to say that this view of the resurrection is not that of the Gospels.

Unquestionably the evangelists were all of the opinion that the body of Jesus which was laid in the grave was that which arose, and which the disciples saw. No one who carefully studies what they have recorded concerning the resurrection can fail to be convinced of this. The importance which they attach to the empty tomb itself proves that such was the case. They recognized, indeed, that the body of Jesus was now controlled by the spirit in such way as to raise it above the ordinary operation of the laws of nature, which was not the case before His crucifixion; but they nevertheless believed it to be of a material character and the same He possessed before His death. The fact that they often doubted whether it was Jesus who appeared to them does not prove that any great apparent change had taken place in His body, but only that they did not expect Him thus to arise from the dead. Even now, if some one who was known to have died, should come forth from the grave in the same body which he had when buried, without the least change having

taken place and without his acting in any but his ordinary ways, men would be certain to be in the same perplexity that the disciples were, and for the same reason.

If, however, the theory advocated in the book we are reviewing be correct, then the disciples and evangelists were in error because Jesus misled them by miraculously resolving His earthly body into its original elements. And for His so doing there was no real necessity. For we can see no reason why Jesus could not have assured His disciples of His resurrection without disposing of His corpse in the way represented, if the resurrection means merely real existence after death in a spiritual body which is nothing more than a counterpart, in the spiritual world, of our present body. That He could have done so, we think, is proved by the revelations made to patriarchs and prophets, and which gave them certainty. Moreover, by allowing His corpse to be subject to the ordinary process of nature He would have revealed the true nature of His resurrection as set forth in the theory under review in such a way as to leave no room for doubt concerning it. We do believe that the Lord in His dealings with us adapts Himself to our needs, and we rejoice in this manifestation of His love. But we cannot believe that His adaptations are ever of such a nature as to mislead those who put their trust in Him; for He is the truth, as well as the way and the life. Hence we are convinced that the theory advanced is erroneous and likely to do harm.

But, perhaps, it will be asked, Does not the view that the crucified body of Jesus was raised up again, require us to hold that the bodies of all the dead will be similarly raised, and does not this involve insuperable difficulties? We think not. "The difficulties," says Dr. Strong, "raised by supposing that the same matter may have entered into the composition of different bodies successively is imaginary, for the All-wise Being, who arranges human destiny, might easily prevent this fortuity, and, in any case, the amount of such reused matter would be too trifling to affect the question seriously. But this absolute sameness of the very atoms is not necessary, for, in this sense, no individual

body is the same at different periods, hardly, indeed, an hour together. It has been estimated that in the course of every ten years its entire substance is replaced. Its identity while living, therefore, does not consist in this, nor in any adventitious feature of size, weight, soundness, or aspect, nor even in its merely sensible or conscious continuity, but simply in being composed of *similar matter, similarly combined and arranged*, and especially by being *animated by the same soul*." The soul of Jesus united itself with the body in the sepulchre because this was still at hand, and so, we have reason to believe, will the souls of others do, whose earthly bodies are still in existence when the resurrection takes place. As regards those whose bodies have been resolved into their original elements, God will reconstitute their bodies out of the same kinds and proportions of matter and in a like organism.

But it may also be asked, Is it not unreasonable to suppose that body and soul should be separated, and then, after long ages, be suddenly reunited again? We reply, the separation is sudden, and so it is not unreasonable to hold that the reunion will be sudden also, but rather the opposite. If it should be further said, that death is generally the consummation of a process, so, we would reply, is the resurrection. Death is caused by sin, and when sin is entirely overcome, then death will also be vanquished. Soul and body may be compared to the waters of two springs that flow together, and for a time are one, then are divided by some obstructing island and flow on separately until the obstruction is overcome, and then reunite and pour their waters into the ocean as a single stream. Each, in this case, in its onward movement, is preparing for the reunion. So the soul in the intermediate state is being fitted for a perfect life, while the material creation of which the body is a part in its onward movement is also being fitted for such existence, by union with perfected spirits. This is what St. Paul teaches in Romans 8: 19-23, in which we have the profoundest philosophy of history yet written.

From what has now been said it will be observed that we

differ greatly from the author whose book we have been reviewing as regards the true nature of death and the resurrection. We believe, with the great body of the Church of all ages, that death in all its forms is the wages of sin, and that it separates soul and body; that after the separation the soul continues its conscious existence in a state of happiness as regards the righteous, and of misery as regards the unrighteous; that at the resurrection which will take place when Christ comes again, soul and body will be reunited and completely perfected; and that then, the righteous will enjoy the greatest blessedness and glory, and the wicked be exposed to the greatest shame and misery. These things we hold are clearly revealed in God's Word, and beyond them we can know nothing certainly either concerning death or the resurrection. None of these things are in conflict with any of the discoveries of science, or, indeed, can be, because they lie beyond the province of science. Speculation concerning them, after giving much attention to it, we are disposed to believe, always does more harm than good. "The secret things belong unto the Lord, our God."

VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THE SONG OF SOLOMON and the LAMENTATIONS OF JEREMIAH. By Walter F. Adeney, M. A., Professor of New Testament Exegesis and Church History, New College, London. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 51 East Tenth Street. 1895. Price, \$1.50.

THE BOOK OF JEREMIAH. Chapters xxi-lil. By W. H. Bennett, M. A., Professor of Old Testament Languages and Literature, Haskney and New Colleges. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 51 East Tenth Street. 1895. Price, \$1.50.

These two volumes are recent issues of the series entitled "The Expositor's Bible," which is rapidly approaching completion. Both are works of superior merit. Professor Adeney's Exposition of the Song of Solomon and the Lamentations of Jeremiah is, indeed, unusually interesting and instructive. The same is true, also, of Professor Bennett's Exposition of the Book of Jeremiah. In both works the results of the best and latest scholarship are brought to bear on the exposition, and many important questions are discussed which are of special interest at the present time. No one, we feel assured, can read either volume without profit. We therefore heartily commend both to the attention of all our readers who are interested in acquainting themselves with the real teachings of God's Word. To any library they will prove a valuable and useful addition.

THE CHRISTLESS NATIONS. By Bishop J. M. Thoburn, D.D. New York: Hunt & Eaton. Cincinnati: Cranston & Curtis. 1895. Price, \$1.00.

This volume consists of a series of addresses on Christless Nations and kindred subjects delivered at Syracuse University on the Graves Foundation during the present year. The different addresses treat, respectively, of The Christless Nations, Missionary Possibilities, Woman in the Mission Field, Missionary Polity, New Testament Missions, and Wayside Views. All the addresses are able and replete with valuable thought. The work should be read by all who are interested and engaged in missionary work. Much may be learned from it, which will be found of service.

THE WAY OUT. A Solution of the Temperance Question. By Rev. Hugh Montgomery. With an Introduction by Daniel Dorchester, D.D. New York: Hunt & Eaton. Cincinnati: Cranston & Curtis. 1895. Price, \$1.00.

Dr. Dorchester says of the author of this book: "He is one of the liveliest of Irishmen. Witty, quaint, bold, eccentric, but withal tender, gentle and persistent. A radical of radicals, yet he is not hide-bound, dry or bitter, but cheerful, sympathetic and tactful." The book itself proves the truthfulness of this description of the author. It is entertaining, and presents much that is worthy of consideration, though we cannot accept all its views and statements as correct. The way out, according to Rev. Montgomery, is *total abstinence*. There can be no doubt that, if all would practice this, the temperance question would be solved.

THE PEOPLE'S BIBLE. Discourses upon Holy Scripture. By Joseph Parker, D.D., London. **EPHESIANS—REVELATIONS.** New York and Toronto: Funk and Wagnalls Company. 1895. Price, \$1.50.

This volume completes "The People's Bible," the publication of which began fifteen years ago. To the work attention has frequently been called in this REVIEW as the different volumes have appeared. The present volume, though the twenty-eighth, is as bright and sparkling, and as replete with instruction as any of its predecessors. Of its author the late Charles H. Spurgeon said: "Dr. Parker condenses wonderfully, and throws a splendor of diction over all that he pours forth. He seems to say all that can be said upon a passage; at times he gives only an outline and leaves the filling up to the thoughtful reader. One is struck with the singular ability and special originality of Dr. Parker. He is no repeater of old remarks, nor is he a superfluous commentator. He is a man of genius, and, whenever he has anything to say, he says it in his own striking manner. His track is his own, and the jewels which he lets fall in his progress are from his own caskets; this will give a permanent value to his works when the productions of copyists will be forgotten."

THE GOSPEL OF BUDDHA. According to Old Records. Told by Paul Carus. Third Edition. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1895. Price, \$1.00.

A notice of the second edition of this work appeared in the July number of this REVIEW. The present edition is in every respect the same as the preceding, and therefore demands no special notice. The fact that it has been so soon called for is, however, a strong testimony to the merits of the book and shows that it is appreciated.

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